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Statutes·November 10, 2026·10 min read

The Wiretap Act's Crime-Tort Exception in Website Tracking Cases

What the criminal or tortious purpose clause of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) requires in website cases, which predicates courts have accepted, and where they divide.

PR
Privacy Resolve
Last reviewed November 10, 2026

One-party consent does not protect an interception made "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act." In a website case against the site operator, the operator's own consent is usually not in doubt, so the argument moves to that clause. This guide sets out what the clause requires, which predicate wrongs courts have accepted at the pleading stage, and the questions on which courts divide. For who counts as a party and whose consent matters, see One-Party Consent and the Party Exception.

What is the crime-tort exception?

It is the last clause of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d): the party and consent exception does not apply when the communication is intercepted "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act." The full clause reads: "unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State."

Two features of the text matter in website cases. The predicate can be a violation of federal or state law. And the clause asks about purpose. In the Ninth Circuit's words, "the focus is not upon whether the interception itself violated another law"; it is on the purpose for the interception, its intended use. Sussman v. American Broadcasting Companies, 186 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1999).

What purpose does the clause require, and when?

The interceptor must intend, at the time of the interception, to use it to commit a criminal or tortious act. The Second Circuit put it this way: "At the time of the recording the offender must intend to use the recording to commit a criminal or tortious act. Merely intending to record the plaintiff is not enough." Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2010).

A lawful purpose does not rule out an unlawful one. The Ninth Circuit said that "the existence of a lawful purpose does not mean that the interception is not also for a tortious or unlawful purpose." Sussman, 186 F.3d at 1202. The same court nonetheless affirmed judgment for the defendant in that case, because the plaintiffs had produced no probative evidence of an illegal or tortious purpose when the recording was made, even assuming the recording was itself a tortious invasion of privacy.

Must the crime or tort be separate from the interception?

Yes, under Second and Third Circuit law: the purpose must be to commit a crime or tort independent of the interception itself, such as a later use or disclosure of what was intercepted.

The Second Circuit requires that the interceptor "intend to commit a crime or tort independent of the act of recording itself." Caro, 618 F.3d at 100.

The Third Circuit observed that, on all the authority it knew of, the criminal or tortious acts the clause contemplates come after the acquisition of the communication and involve a criminal or tortious use of what was intercepted. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation, 806 F.3d 125, 145 (3d Cir. 2015). On that reasoning it treated intrusion upon seclusion, which occurs through the interception itself, as outside the clause.

Defendants build on these decisions to argue that a disclosure made by the same transmission that accomplishes the interception is not independent of it. Some courts have rejected that argument and treated the disclosure to a third party as the separate act. One wrote that the alleged wrong "meets the independence requirement because the disclosure of the data is separate from the interception of the data." M.C. 1 v. Curriculum Associates, LLC, No. 25-13942-FDS, ECF No. 49, at 7 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2026). Another treated the alleged violation of a state privacy statute as occurring through the hospital's use and disclosure of the communications it acquired, not through the act of interception. Doe v. Baystate Health System, Inc., No. 1:25-cv-10337-JEK, ECF No. 42, at 11 (D. Mass. Mar. 19, 2026), 2026 WL 776861. A predicate pleaded as complete at the moment of interception remains exposed to the independence argument.

Can a HIPAA disclosure be the criminal act?

Federal courts in New York and Illinois have accepted it at the pleading stage, because 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 makes it a crime to knowingly disclose individually identifiable health information in violation of HIPAA's rules.

Section 1320d-6(a)(3) reaches a person who "knowingly and in violation of this part" "discloses individually identifiable health information to another person." Section 1320d-6(b)(3) sets the highest penalty tier when the offense is committed "with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm."

In Cooper v. Mount Sinai Health System, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 3d 369, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2024), the court denied the motion to dismiss a Wiretap Act claim over advertising tracking code on a health system's website and patient portal, holding the crime-tort exception plausibly alleged because disclosing individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage would violate § 1320d-6.

In Stein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health, No. 23-cv-14515, ECF No. 53, at 8, 2025 WL 580556 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2025), reconsideration denied and question certified, No. 23-cv-14515, ECF No. 71 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2026), appeal docketed, No. 26-1742 (7th Cir.), the court wrote that "[a] disclosure that violates HIPAA is a violation of law that is independent of a violation of the ECPA."

Other courts have dismissed claims resting on the same predicate, and the Stein reconsideration order collects decisions on both sides. ECF No. 71, at 6 (appeal pending, No. 26-1742). The commercial-motive question below is one of the main points of division.

The predicate needs HIPAA to apply. The protected category is "individually identifiable health information," which 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6) limits to information "created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse" that relates to a person's health, care or payment for care and identifies the person, or as to which "there is a reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify the individual." Where the operator is outside HIPAA, a complaint needs another predicate. For how much of HHS's guidance on public pages survives, see HIPAA, Pixels and AHA v. Becerra. For addiction treatment programs, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(f) applies § 1320d-6 to a violation of § 290dd-2, the confidentiality statute behind 42 C.F.R. Part 2; see Website Tracking at Addiction Treatment Programs.

What other predicates have courts accepted?

State privacy statutes and torts, and federal statutes other than HIPAA, have each been accepted at the pleading stage where the complaint alleged a disclosure to a third party separate from the interception. Examples:

  • Doe v. Baystate Health System, Inc., No. 1:25-cv-10337-JEK, ECF No. 42, at 8 (D. Mass. Mar. 19, 2026) (a state privacy statute): the court held the complaint plausibly alleged an interception "for the purpose of committing a tortious act in violation of M.G.L. c. 214, § 1B," Massachusetts' privacy statute.
  • Garcia v. Truist Financial Corp., 825 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2026) (a privacy tort): a bank that "chose to embed the LinkedIn Insight Tag on its Website, which it owns and operates," and so disclosed sensitive information consumers entered to LinkedIn, was plausibly alleged to have intercepted for a tortious purpose, invasion of privacy, although the complaint alleged it installed the tag "to assist with its marketing efforts."
  • Cheung v. Slickdeals, LLC, No. 2:26-cv-00519, ECF No. 44, at 23, 2026 WL 1872831 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2026) (the Video Privacy Protection Act; ruling on the original complaint): the court found that the plaintiffs "sufficiently allege that defendant intercepted plaintiff Cheung's communications for the purpose of committing a separate and independent tortious act such that the party consent defense is inapplicable at the pleading stage," where the site allegedly disclosed his purchases to advertisers.
  • In re Allstate and Arity Consumer Privacy Litigation, No. 25 CV 407, ECF No. 74, at 25-26 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2026) (the Fair Credit Reporting Act): the court sustained a federal wiretap count on alleged willful inaccurate reporting under that Act.

Each of these rulings accepted pleaded facts at the motion to dismiss stage. None decided liability.

Does an advertising or profit motive defeat the exception?

Courts are divided. Several recent decisions hold that a commercial motive does not rule out a criminal or tortious purpose, other courts have gone the other way, and the Seventh Circuit has agreed to hear the question.

The decisions rejecting the profit-motive defense build on Sussman's point that a lawful purpose and an unlawful one can coexist:

  • "[T]he existence of a financial motivation is not a get-out-of-liability-free card," and the statute "requires a purpose to do an unlawful act, not an unlawful purpose to commit an act." Stein, ECF No. 53, at 12; Stein, ECF No. 71, at 5 (appeal pending, No. 26-1742).
  • "[A] monetary motive does not foreclose the crime/tort exemption," which applies "so long as the interception is intended to further an act, separate and apart from the interception, which happens to be criminal or tortious." In re Allstate and Arity, ECF No. 74, at 25.
  • "[M]any crimes and torts, such as fraud and conversion, are normally committed solely for monetary gain." M.C. 1, ECF No. 49, at 9.
  • "[A]llegations of financial motivation do not preclude a tortious purpose." Cheung, ECF No. 44, at 24.

The split is acknowledged in the same litigation. In Stein, the district judge wrote on reconsideration that "courts are split on how best to read this statute," collecting decisions on both sides, and certified for interlocutory appeal whether the exception applies when a complaint alleges a lawful purpose and no criminal or tortious purpose. ECF No. 71, at 6. The Seventh Circuit granted permission to appeal on April 9, 2026, and the appeal, No. 26-1742, had not been decided as of November 9, 2026. Until it is, and in circuits that have not addressed the question, expect the commercial-motive argument and answer it on the facts pleaded.

Who decides the purpose question, and when?

In decisions denying dismissal, purpose is a fact question left to the record, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment for a defendant whose opponents offered no probative evidence of a tortious purpose.

The Baystate court held that whether the hospital "was primarily or determinatively motivated" by a lawful purpose, an unlawful one, "or both is a question of fact not fit for resolution at the pleading stage." ECF No. 42, at 9. The M.C. 1 court called primary motivation "an issue that is best resolved on a factual record, not from the bare allegations of the complaint." ECF No. 49, at 9. The Cheung court said that deciding whether the alleged tort was only "incidental" is a determination "better made on a more complete factual record." ECF No. 44, at 23-24. Sussman shows the other end of the case: at judgment, purpose needs evidence.

Evidence of purpose in a website case usually comes from the operator's own choices and what it was told. That includes which pages carried which tags, which events and parameters the operator configured, what the operator promised visitors, what happened after a visitor refused, and what the vendor's terms said. Section 1.h of the Meta Business Tools Terms, for example, reads: "You represent and warrant that you will not share Business Tool Data with us that ... (iv) includes or is based on, directly or otherwise, health information, financial information, consumer report information, or other categories of sensitive information." Google's policy for Analytics advertising features says: "If you use Google Analytics to collect sensitive information about your visitors, as described in the Google Ads sensitive category restrictions, you may not use Google Analytics to collect data for the purpose of interest based advertising."

What should a complaint or a response address on purpose?

Both sides should identify the separate act, the law it violates, and the evidence of purpose at the time of the interception, because those are the points the decisions turn on.

For a complaint:

  1. Name the predicate statute or tort and the act that violates it, as distinct from the interception: usually the disclosure to a third party and its later use.
  2. Plead facts showing purpose at the time of the interception: the configuration choices, the vendor's terms, and the promises made to visitors.
  3. Plead why the predicate reaches this operator, such as HIPAA coverage, or the privacy statute of the state the visitor was in.

For a response:

  1. Test whether the predicate applies at all, starting with HIPAA coverage under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6).
  2. Test independence under the governing circuit's rule.
  3. Address purpose with the record, recognizing that several courts treat it as a question of fact.
  4. Track the Seventh Circuit appeal from the certification order in Stein, ECF No. 71, docketed as No. 26-1742, which may settle the commercial-motive question in that circuit.

What sources does this guide rely on?

This guide relies on the statute text, court decisions and vendor terms listed here, quoted from the copies linked. Checked on November 10, 2026.

General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.