Interception is the act the federal Wiretap Act regulates. The word is defined in one sentence of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4), and website cases often turn on how that sentence applies to what a browser sent. This guide takes the definition apart, element by element, with what courts have said about each, including the decisions that cut the other way. For the consent rule and the damages provision, see Federal Wiretap Act for Websites and What the Federal Wiretap Act's Damages Provision Says.
What does "intercept" mean in the Wiretap Act?
Section 2510(4) defines intercept as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
The words "or other" after "aural," and the word "electronic" in the list of communications, were added by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. Before then, the definition covered only aural acquisition of wire or oral communications. The Second Circuit explained that "or other" was inserted "to ensure privacy protection for new forms of communication such as electronic pagers, electronic mail, and computer-to-computer communications." United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992).
The definition has four parts: an acquisition, of contents, of a wire, electronic or oral communication, through a device. Section 2510(12) defines an electronic communication as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature" sent in whole or in part by wire, radio or a similar system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, and Section 2510(5) defines the device as "any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication," apart from listed exceptions such as telephone equipment used in the ordinary course of business and hearing aids.
What counts as an acquisition?
Federal appeals courts have said an interception occurs when a communication's contents are captured or redirected, and that recording a communication is itself an acquisition, whether or not anyone listens to it.
In a telephone case, the Second Circuit wrote that "when the contents of a wire communication are captured or redirected in any way, an interception occurs at that time." Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 136.
The Fourth Circuit held that recording a telephone conversation is by itself an aural acquisition of that conversation. Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1994). That case concerned a voice logger that recorded calls, with scant evidence that anyone listened to them. The same opinion held that sound carried by an open microphone, which no one recorded or listened to, was not an interception: no contents were acquired, and the transmission, caused by a design defect no one knew of, was not intentional (id. at 742-43).
In website cases, the question is usually whether an outside company acquired the contents of the visitor's exchange with the site, for example through a copy that the visitor's browser sent it.
What are the "contents" of a communication?
Section 2510(8) says contents "includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication."
Before 1986 the definition also covered the identity of the parties and the existence of the communication. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act struck those words.
The First Circuit read the definition to encompass "personally identifiable information such as a party's name, date of birth, and medical condition," where visitors had entered that kind of information into forms on pharmaceutical companies' websites. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003), on remand, summary judgment granted, 292 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003) (interception not intentional).
The Ninth Circuit read it more narrowly. In In re Zynga Privacy Litigation, 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014), it held that the term "refers to the intended message conveyed by the communication, and does not include record information regarding the characteristics of the message that is generated in the course of the communication."
The same court found that the referer header information in that case, a user's ID and the address of the page the user came from, did not meet the definition (id. at 1107). It added: "Under some circumstances, a user's request to a search engine for specific information could constitute a communication such that divulging a URL containing that search term to a third party could amount to disclosure of the contents of a communication" (id. at 1108-09). The court affirmed the dismissal of the Wiretap Act and Stored Communications Act claims in that case.
The record of a visit shows what each request carried, whether a typed search, a form entry, a page address or an identifier, and that is where the analysis of contents starts.
Does the acquisition have to happen while the communication is in transit?
Several circuits have said an interception must be contemporaneous with the communication, and courts have found that test met where a copy was made as the message traveled.
The Seventh Circuit noted that several circuits have said an interception must be contemporaneous with the communication to violate Section 2511. United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 705-06 (7th Cir. 2010), as amended (Nov. 29, 2010). In that case, copies of emails were made for the defendant within a second of each message's arrival, and the court said: "That's contemporaneous by any standard." It described the copying at the server as "the unlawful interception, catching the message 'in flight'" (id. at 704).
The First Circuit did not decide whether a real-time requirement exists, because the acquisition before it "was contemporaneous with the transmission by the internet users to the pharmaceutical companies." Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22. It added: "Separate, but simultaneous and identical, communications satisfy even the strictest real-time requirement" (id.).
Does the Act require intent?
Yes: Section 2511(1)(a) reaches a person who "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept" a communication.
In 1986 Congress replaced "willfully" with "intentionally" in Section 2511(1)(a) through (d). The First Circuit said Congress made clear that the purpose of the amendment was to underscore "that inadvertent interceptions are not a basis for criminal or civil liability under the ECPA." Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 23. On remand in that case, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the Section 2511 claim because the interception was not intentional. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003).
Sections 2511(1)(c) and (d) separately reach a person who intentionally discloses or uses the contents of a communication, "knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection."
Whether the civil action in Section 2520 reaches a person who only procured an interception is contested. One federal court recently wrote that "the majority have rejected the notion that a defendant may be held liable" for aiding and abetting or procuring an interception. Nichols v. PeaceHealth Networks on Demand LLC, No. 2:25-cv-01831-JHC, ECF No. 16, at 9 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2026).
Who is a party to a visitor's exchange with a website?
The visitor and the website are the two ends of the exchange; federal appeals courts have reached different results on when an outside company that receives a copy is also a party.
The party rule is in Section 2511(2)(d): an interception is not unlawful where the person intercepting "is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception," unless the communication is intercepted "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State."
The Ninth Circuit held that a defendant whose code makes a visitor's browser send it a simultaneous, unknown duplicate of the visitor's communication with a website is not exempt, as a matter of law, from liability under the Wiretap Act or CIPA as a party to that communication. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, 956 F.3d 589, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Facebook, Inc. v. Davis, No. 20-727 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2021).
The Third Circuit, on the facts pleaded before it, reached a different result. It reasoned that where users' browsers communicate directly with the defendants about the pages being visited, the defendants have no need to acquire that information from transmissions to which they are not a party, and it treated a recipient the browser communicates with directly as a party to the communication. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation, 806 F.3d 125, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2015).
The website itself is one end of the exchange, so a claim about the website's own role turns on the party and consent rules and the crime-tort proviso. Federal Wiretap Act for Websites covers how courts have applied them.
What does Section 2520 add?
Section 2520(a) gives a civil action to "any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter."
The action runs against "the person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation." Subsection (b) lists the relief: equitable or declaratory relief, damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate cases, and a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs. Subsection (e) sets a two-year filing period. Our damages guide walks through each subsection.
How do these elements apply to a website visit?
Read the record of the visit against each element: what the browser sent, where it went, when it went, what it carried, and whether a party's consent or an exception applies.
The network record answers the first four questions directly. The last depends on the site's own setup, its Terms and the law where the claim proceeds. State laws use their own definitions and exceptions; California's Section 631(a), for example, speaks of "the consent of all parties to the communication." See State Privacy Laws and Website Tracking for how they differ, and the sample transmission guide for how to read a request.
What sources does this guide rely on?
This guide relies on the statutes and decisions listed below, each read in its official or published text, with the later history of each decision that has one.
Checked on November 10, 2026.
- 18 U.S.C. § 2510, definitions, with the notes on the 1986 amendments
- 18 U.S.C. § 2511, prohibitions and exceptions
- 18 U.S.C. § 2520, the civil action
- California Penal Code § 631
- United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1992)
- Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1994)
- In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003), errata (1st Cir. May 30, 2003), on remand, summary judgment granted, 292 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003) (interception not intentional)
- United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010), as amended (Nov. 29, 2010)
- In re Zynga Privacy Litigation, 750 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014)
- In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Facebook, Inc. v. Davis, No. 20-727 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2021)
- In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation, 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015)
- Nichols v. PeaceHealth Networks on Demand LLC, No. 2:25-cv-01831-JHC, ECF No. 16 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2026)