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Case notes·November 10, 2026·4 min read

Drazen v. Pinto: For Standing, a Privacy Harm Must Match in Kind, Not Degree

The en banc Eleventh Circuit held that one unwanted text message is a concrete injury because it is similar in kind to intrusion upon seclusion. Why that test matters.

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Privacy Resolve
Last reviewed November 10, 2026

Before a federal court decides whether a company violated a privacy law, it asks whether the person suing was concretely harmed. Since the Supreme Court's 2021 decision on standing for statutory claims, courts answer by comparing the harm the statute addresses with harms the common law has long recognized. Companies often argue that the comparison fails because the plaintiff's harm is milder than the old tort required. Drazen v. Pinto, decided by the full Eleventh Circuit, rejects that argument with a simple test: the harms must be similar in kind, not in degree.

The case at a glance

Drazen v. Pinto, 74 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc), No. 21-10199. Decided July 24, 2023, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, in a unanimous opinion by Judge Rosenbaum.

One text message and a class settlement

The case grew out of a class settlement with a web-hosting company over telemarketing calls and text messages under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The settlement class included people who had received only one text message. A 2019 decision of the same court had held that receiving a single text message was not a concrete injury, and a panel applied that rule to vacate the settlement's approval. The full court agreed to rehear the question.

The company argued that the closest common-law harm, intrusion upon seclusion, requires an intrusion that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and that one text message falls short of that.

What the court held

The test. "We think that asking whether the harms are similar in kind but not degree makes sense." (Slip op. at 15.)

Nothing essential was missing. The court contrasted cases where an element of the old tort is entirely absent: "Here, by contrast, none of the elements for the common-law comparator tort are completely missing." (Slip op. at 16.)

Congress sets the threshold. "But the Constitution empowers Congress to decide what degree of harm is enough so long as that harm is similar in kind to a traditional harm." (Slip op. at 17.)

The holding. "In sum, then, we hold that the harm associated with an unwanted text message shares a close relationship with the harm underlying the tort of intrusion upon seclusion." (Slip op. at 17.) The court sent the appeal back to the panel to decide the remaining settlement questions.

Why it matters for privacy claims about health searches and page visits

This is a text-message case. It did not decide anything about websites, pixels or the Wiretap Act, and it should not be described as if it did. Its importance lies in the method it sets for the standing question that opens nearly every privacy lawsuit in federal court, a question that comes up long before anyone asks whether a website's tracking was lawful.

The typical defense argument runs like this: the common-law privacy torts required something dramatic, such as an intrusion a reasonable person would find highly offensive, and a visitor whose page views were sent to an advertising company suffered nothing that serious. The Eleventh Circuit's answer to the same kind of argument, made there about a text message, is that the comparison is about the type of harm, not its size. If the statutory harm is the same kind of injury the old tort addressed, a smaller dose of it can still be concrete, because Congress may decide how much is enough.

That reasoning matters in Florida, Georgia and Alabama, where Eleventh Circuit decisions bind the federal courts. For someone in those states whose health-related searches or page visits were sent to third parties, the question is whether that kind of harm resembles the intrusion into private matters that intrusion upon seclusion has always addressed. Under Drazen, a court in that circuit should not dismiss a statutory privacy claim merely because the intrusion is smaller than the one a common-law jury would have required, so long as the harm is of the same kind.

The decision addressed intrusion upon seclusion specifically, and it still asks whether any element of the comparator tort is completely missing. A claim compared to a different common-law tort needs its own analysis.

What the company argued, and how the court answered

Offensiveness. The company argued that a single text is not highly offensive. The court accepted that a single text might not satisfy the common law's offensiveness element on its own terms, and held that this was a difference of degree, which Congress is entitled to set.

A missing element. The court distinguished a missing element from a smaller version of the same harm. Where every element has a counterpart in the new harm, even at lower intensity, the relationship is close enough.

The court found its line in the company's own position at oral argument: the company accepted that receiving one unwanted text a day for a month would be offensive enough. The court reasoned that once repeated texts count, the dispute over a single text is only about how much harm is enough, which is a question of degree (slip op. at 17).

Subsequent history

On remand, a panel decided the settlement questions under the Class Action Fairness Act, vacated the district court's judgment and fee order, and returned the case to that court. It first ruled in an opinion issued May 13, 2024, then withdrew that opinion and substituted a revised one on rehearing on July 16, 2024. Neither opinion revisits the en banc standing holding, which remains the law of the Eleventh Circuit.

Read the opinion

Related case notes: Doe v. Baystate Health System and Cheung v. Slickdeals, where standing for website privacy claims was argued.

Checked on November 10, 2026.

Privacy Resolve is not a law firm, and this is not legal advice.

General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.