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Case notes·November 18, 2026·5 min read

Stein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health: A HIPAA Disclosure as the Separate Criminal Act

An Illinois federal court held that a health care provider's alleged HIPAA disclosure to Facebook met the Wiretap Act's crime-tort exception, profit motive or not.

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Privacy Resolve
Last reviewed November 18, 2026

Health care providers sued over website tracking tend to make two Wiretap Act arguments: each was a party to its patients' communications, and it shared the data for marketing, not to commit a crime. Stein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health answered both at the pleading stage: a disclosure that violates HIPAA is an unlawful act separate from the interception, and a profit motive does not change that.

The case at a glance

Stein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health, No. 23-cv-14515, ECF No. 53, 2025 WL 580556 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2025), reconsideration denied and question certified, ECF No. 71 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2026), appeal pending, No. 26-1742 (7th Cir.). Decided by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Steven C. Seeger). The Wiretap Act and negligence claims survived the motion to dismiss; the rest, including an Illinois Eavesdropping Statute claim, were dismissed. The Seventh Circuit had not decided the appeal as of November 18, 2026.

A patient portal, the Meta Pixel and the Conversions API

Edward-Elmhurst Health is a health care provider with dozens of locations in Illinois. Patients use its website to book appointments and communicate symptoms, and its MyChart portal to communicate with doctors and see test results. The plaintiffs, who believed they were communicating only with their providers, alleged that the provider embedded the Meta Pixel on both, sending Facebook their clicks, keystrokes and details of their medical treatment with their Facebook IDs, and installed Facebook's Conversions API, which stores website interactions on the provider's servers and then sends them to Facebook. They alleged it did this for marketing and profit, despite public statements about protecting patients' health information. The plaintiffs defended three of eight claims (ECF No. 53 at 1, 3-5).

What the court held

The exception and its limit. The Wiretap Act, which the court calls the ECPA (the Electronic Communications Privacy Act), lets a party intercept its own communications unless they are intercepted "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). The crime or tort must be something other than the interception itself (ECF No. 53 at 6-7).

A HIPAA disclosure is that separate act. The complaint alleged that the provider disclosed the plaintiffs' individually identifiable health information to a third party, which 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3) makes a crime when done knowingly. The court held: "A disclosure that violates HIPAA is a violation of law that is independent of a violation of the ECPA." (ECF No. 53 at 8.) Courts in the district and elsewhere had recognized the same basis for the exception (ECF No. 53 at 8-9).

A profit motive is no defense. The provider relied on the complaint's own profit allegations, but the court looked to the text: "The purpose must be to commit an act, and that act must be criminal or tortious." (ECF No. 53 at 10-11.) It concluded that "the existence of a financial motivation is not a get-out-of-liability-free card." (ECF No. 53 at 12.) The HIPAA allegation was "enough to get around the ECPA's one-party consent rule, because the crime-tort exception applies." (ECF No. 53 at 12.)

The Illinois claim was dismissed; negligence survived. One eavesdropping provision pleaded reaches only oral conversations; the other requires information obtained in violation of the statute, which the complaint did not allege, since it alleged no eavesdropping device and the provider was a party to the communications (ECF No. 53 at 12-15). On negligence, Illinois law requires data collectors to maintain reasonable security measures, a duty not limited to data breaches, and collecting private health data was enough to create one (ECF No. 53 at 16-17).

Why it matters for health care providers' websites

For a provider covered by HIPAA, the separate act can come from HIPAA itself: here, the alleged disclosure of clicks, keystrokes and treatment details from a website and patient portal to an advertising platform, tied to each person's account. The exception required no intent to break the law: a party does not have to say, in effect, "I want to commit a crime" (ECF No. 53 at 10).

The decision also answers the common marketing defense. In re Allstate and Arity, a later decision in the same district, relied on this reasoning (No. 25 CV 407, ECF No. 74 at 25). See the guides to the crime-tort exception, the Meta Pixel on health websites and the Conversions API and server-side tagging.

What the provider argued, and how the court answered

Marketing, not crime. The provider argued that sharing information with Facebook for marketing put it outside the exception (ECF No. 53 at 9; ECF No. 71 at 4). Requiring an unlawful purpose, the court said, adds a mental-state element Congress did not write: "The statute requires a purpose to do an unlawful act, not an unlawful purpose to commit an act." (ECF No. 71 at 5.) The court's example: a driver who changes lanes without looking and hits another car meant to change lanes, a tortious act, without any tortious purpose (ECF No. 53 at 11).

The interception as its own crime. The provider said the court's reading lets the act of recording trigger the exception. The court said it had held the opposite (ECF No. 71 at 4 n.1); the separate act was the alleged HIPAA disclosure.

Party status and the privacy policy. Being a party brought in the one-party consent rule, which the exception overcame, and helped defeat the Illinois claim (ECF No. 53 at 6-8, 15). The court put aside whether the provider took on a duty through its privacy statements, which it said its privacy policy disclaimed; negligence rested on the duty Illinois law imposes on data collectors (ECF No. 53 at 16-17).

Subsequent history

On March 3, 2026, the court wrote: "For the reasons stated below, the motion for reconsideration is denied. But this Court will grant the request for certification of an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)." (ECF No. 71 at 1.) It acknowledged: "Admittedly, courts are split on how best to read this statute." (ECF No. 71 at 6.) Saying it did not view the question as close, it certified whether the exception applies when a complaint alleges a lawful purpose and no criminal or tortious purpose (ECF No. 71 at 7). The appeal, No. 26-1742, is pending in the Seventh Circuit, which granted permission to appeal on April 9, 2026, and had not decided it as of November 18, 2026.

Both rulings came at the motion to dismiss stage: they accept the complaint's allegations as true and make no finding that they are true (ECF No. 53 at 1).

Read the opinion

Related case notes: Mekhail v. North Memorial Health Care, In re Allstate and Arity Consumer Privacy Litigation, which relied on this decision, M.C. 1 v. Curriculum Associates, Doe v. Baystate Health System and Garcia v. Truist.

Checked on November 18, 2026.

Privacy Resolve is not a law firm, and this is not legal advice.

General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.