Most website wiretap cases come down to one question. A website is a party to every exchange it has with a visitor, and the federal Wiretap Act does not make a party's own interception unlawful unless it was done "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act." So what makes a website's purpose tortious? Garcia v. Truist Financial Corp. gives a direct answer at the pleading stage: a site that chooses to embed another company's tag, and through it hands that company sensitive information visitors enter, can be alleged to have acted to invade their privacy.
The case at a glance
Garcia v. Truist Financial Corp., 825 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2026), No. 2:25-cv-05753-MEMF-PVC, ECF No. 33. Decided March 25, 2026, by the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which denied the bank's motion to dismiss in full.
The loan application and the LinkedIn tag
In May 2025 the plaintiff applied for an unsecured loan through the bank's website, using the same browser he used for his LinkedIn account. The application asked for his citizenship, his housing status and his employment. He alleged that the LinkedIn Insight Tag installed on the site passed that information to LinkedIn, and that neither company had his consent. He sued under the federal Wiretap Act, Sections 631 and 632 of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, and the privacy clause of the California Constitution.
What the court held
The parties agreed that the federal statute is a one-party consent law, so the bank, as a party to the communications, was protected unless the crime-tort exception applied. The court held that it did, at least on the complaint's allegations.
The order put it plainly: "Here, the Court finds that Garcia has sufficiently alleged a tortious purpose to satisfy the exception." The tortious purpose was invasion of privacy. The court pointed to the allegations that the bank "chose to embed the LinkedIn Insight Tag on its Website, which it owns and operates," and that through the tag it disclosed sensitive and confidential information that consumers provided. It concluded: "Therefore, when viewing the facts in Garcia's favor, the Court finds that Garcia has plausibly alleged that Truist's purpose was, at the very least, tortious, thereby satisfying the crime-tort exception." Garcia, 825 F. Supp. 3d at 1166; ECF No. 33 at 15-16.
The plaintiff had also argued that the facts made out a crime under federal financial privacy law. The court did not need to decide that question (ECF No. 33 at 16 n.6); the privacy tort was enough.
The California claims survived as well. On the constitutional claim, the court found that releasing information such as a person's citizenship and employment status is an "egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right."
Why it matters when health details are typed into a website
The purpose the court accepted did not depend on a specialized statute. It rested on the ordinary tort of invasion of privacy. That matters because many websites where people look up symptoms, order tests, buy treatments or book visits are not hospitals or health plans, and are not governed by the federal rules that apply to them. Under the reasoning in Garcia, the question is what the site chose to do and what its code sent, not which regulatory label fits the business.
The court also focused on choice. The bank did not merely host a page; it "chose to embed" the tag on a site "which it owns and operates." That is the structure of most health tracking claims too: the website decides which tags to load, and the tag carries what the visitor typed or clicked to an advertising platform. A person who entered a condition into a site search, answered intake questions or selected a reason for an appointment stands in a similar position to a loan applicant who typed in his citizenship.
Finally, the information in Garcia was a loan applicant's citizenship, housing and employment. Courts weigh sensitivity case by case, but if those answers were enough to carry the claims past a motion to dismiss, information about a diagnosis, a prescription or a specialist is an obvious point of comparison. For how this exception works across the statute as a whole, see our guide to the federal Wiretap Act for websites.
What the bank argued, and how the court answered
The marketing argument. The bank pointed to the complaint's own statement that it integrated the tag "to assist with its marketing efforts," and argued that a marketing goal rules out a tortious one. The court denied the motion anyway and found the tortious purpose plausibly alleged. The order does not discuss the marketing point in separate words, but its result means a marketing motive did not end the case at the pleading stage.
The privacy policy argument. The bank argued that the plaintiff shared his information voluntarily under its privacy policy. The court's answer: "But Truist does not allege the contents of the privacy policy that Garcia agreed to for the sharing of his information, or that any sharing was consistent with the policy." A company that wants to rely on its policy has to show what the policy says and that the sharing matched it; the court noted the bank could try again at summary judgment.
The timing argument. The bank argued that LinkedIn received the information only after the application was submitted. The court read the complaint's description of how the tag sends a request while the visitor is using the page as supporting a reasonable inference that the communications were read in transit (ECF No. 33 at 17-18).
The contents argument. The bank argued that what LinkedIn received was record information about the communications rather than their contents. The court found that the application answers the tag transmitted, such as citizenship, housing and employment, were the substance of what the applicant was communicating, which is what the statute protects (ECF No. 33 at 18).
Standing, notice and jurisdiction. The bank also argued that the plaintiff had no concrete injury, that the complaint did not identify his own data, and that a California court could not hear claims against a North Carolina company. The court rejected each argument: the disclosure of what he entered was a concrete privacy harm, the complaint described what was disclosed, and the bank directed its conduct at California applicants (ECF No. 33 at 8-15).
Subsequent history
The bank answered the complaint on April 8, 2026, rather than asking the court to reconsider or seeking an immediate appeal. The docket since then shows only case-management activity, and no later order changes the ruling. Like any ruling on a motion to dismiss, it accepts the complaint's allegations as true and makes no finding that they are true. It is the ruling of one federal district court, which does not bind other courts, and the case continues there.
Read the opinion
Related case notes: Doe v. Baystate Health System and In re Allstate and Arity Consumer Privacy Litigation.
Checked on November 10, 2026.
Privacy Resolve is not a law firm, and this is not legal advice.