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Case notes·November 10, 2026·5 min read

In re Allstate and Arity: Why a Money Motive Does Not Defeat the Crime-Tort Exception

A federal court in Chicago ruled that a profit motive does not defeat the Wiretap Act's crime-tort exception, and explained what the separate unlawful act must be.

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Privacy Resolve
Last reviewed November 10, 2026

A company accused of intercepting people's communications almost always says it acted to make money, and companies often present that as a complete defense. In re Allstate and Arity Consumer Privacy Litigation takes the opposite view and states it in one sentence: "The Court agrees with the plaintiffs that a monetary motive does not foreclose the crime/tort exemption." The decision is also useful for what it says the plaintiff does have to show.

The case at a glance

In re Allstate and Arity Consumer Privacy Litigation, No. 25 CV 407, ECF No. 74 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2026). Decided March 3, 2026, by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Jeremy C. Daniel). The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, and the federal wiretap count survived.

Phone apps, a hidden kit and insurance decisions

Auto-insurance consumers alleged that an insurer's technology subsidiaries paid the makers of phone apps to build a software development kit into their apps. Once installed, the kit allegedly collected location, route history, driving behavior, phone usage and identifiers in real time and sent them to the defendants, who used the data to make insurance decisions and sold it to other insurers. The plaintiffs alleged that the kit could not reliably tell whether a person was driving, so it recorded trips as a passenger in a bus, a taxi or a friend's car as driving, and that they faced denied coverage and higher premiums as a result. They brought federal and state claims, including under the federal Wiretap Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

What the court held

The app makers' consent did not end the claim. The defendants argued that the apps, as parties to the users' communications, had consented by building in the kit, which would bring the Wiretap Act's one-party consent rule into play. The court accepted that part of the argument (slip op. at 22-23). It then turned to the exception the statute itself makes for interceptions done "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act."

A money motive does not foreclose the exception. "The Court agrees with the plaintiffs that a monetary motive does not foreclose the crime/tort exemption." (Slip op. at 25.)

The test is a separate unlawful act. "The Court therefore concludes that the crime/tort exemption applies so long as the interception is intended to further an act, separate and apart from the interception, which happens to be criminal or tortious." (Slip op. at 25.)

A later reporting violation was enough. The court pointed to the allegation that, after intercepting the communications, the technology subsidiaries furnished the information to third parties and willfully produced inaccurate data in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act: "As discussed below, the plaintiffs state a claim under the FCRA, and this satisfies the crime/tort exemption. This means Count I cannot be dismissed under § 2511(2)(d)." (Slip op. at 25-26.)

Consent is usually for later. The court refused to decide consent from the apps' terms and permission screens at the pleading stage, noting that "consent is an element of some claims, but an affirmative defense for others. And 'courts should usually refrain from granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions on affirmative defenses' unless 'all relevant facts are present.'" (Slip op. at 12-13.)

The court also sorted the data. It found that much of it was location or device information that the statute does not treat as the "contents" of a communication, but that other categories, including information that may reflect users' communications with apps and websites, allowed the wiretap claim to proceed (slip op. at 26-29).

Why it matters when health data is used after it is collected

This is a phone-app case about insurance data, not a website case, and it should be read that way. Its value lies in two general points about the Wiretap Act that apply wherever a company argues it acted for business reasons.

First, the court read the statute's words for what they ask. The exception covers an interception made "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act." On the court's reading, the question is whether the interception was meant to further an act that happens to be unlawful, not whether the company wanted to break the law for its own sake. Almost every company that shares visitor data with advertisers does it for revenue. If revenue were a defense, the exception would rarely apply to anyone.

Second, the unlawful act can come later. Here it was the alleged reporting of inaccurate data to third parties, which happened after the collection. For people whose health searches or page visits were collected, the same structure asks what was done with the information afterward: whether it was sold, used to build profiles, or disclosed in a way some other law forbids. When the interception was meant to further a later use of that kind, and that use is itself unlawful, the test this decision applied is met.

The structure of the case also resembles many website claims. A third party's code was built into someone else's product, the product's owner agreed to it, and, as alleged, the users did not know. The court accepted the owner's consent and still let the claim proceed, because consent is not the end of the analysis when the interception is meant to further a separate unlawful act.

What the defendants argued, and how the court answered

Business purposes. The defendants argued that they acted for business purposes, to make money. The court held that a monetary motive does not foreclose the exception and asked instead whether the interception was meant to further a separate unlawful act.

Consent through the apps. The defendants asked the court to read the app agreements and sign-up screens and find consent. The court declined, because there were factual disputes about which versions applied and whether each plaintiff took the steps needed to accept them, and because consent is often an affirmative defense the defendant must prove (slip op. at 5-7, 12-13).

Interception. The defendants argued that the kit received the data inside the app and only later passed it along. The court saw no difference between the defendants' own tool receiving the information and the defendants receiving it (slip op. at 29-30).

Subsequent history

The defendants answered the complaint in April 2026, and the court has since entered a schedule for discovery, class certification and dispositive motions in 2027. No later order on the docket changes the ruling. The ruling accepts the complaint's allegations as true and makes no finding that the reporting law was violated.

Read the opinion

Related case notes: M.C. 1 v. Curriculum Associates and Baker v. Index Exchange.

Checked on November 10, 2026.

Privacy Resolve is not a law firm, and this is not legal advice.

General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.