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· Agency action

Attorney General of the State of New York and The NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital (settlement)

New York Attorney General

Agency actionAssurance of Discontinuance under New York Executive Law § 63(15), signed in December 2023 and effective January 15, 2024, with a $300,000 payment

Primary source: Attorney General announcement. Checked on November 10, 2026.

NewYork-Presbyterian agreed to pay New York $300,000 and to vet and audit tracking tools after the Attorney General found that its website pixels sometimes sent doctor, condition and appointment details to third parties.

What happened

The Attorney General's findings describe NewYork-Presbyterian as operating ten hospitals in and around New York City. Its public website lets visitors research conditions and search for doctors, and links to separate portals where visitors log in to book appointments online and hold virtual appointments. The Attorney General found that from June 2016 until it disabled them in June 2022, NYP used third-party tracking pixels and tags on the website for marketing. They came from Bing, DoubleClick, Meta/Facebook, Google, iHeartMedia, TikTok, The Trade Desk and Twitter, and they were not deployed in the patient portal.

According to the findings, most third parties received the visitor's IP address and the address of the page loaded or link clicked. Several received cookie identifiers that let them recognize returning users, and Meta may also have received names, email and mailing addresses and gender entered on a page where its pixel loaded. Search, condition and appointment pages sometimes put the doctor or condition in the page address, so a search for spine surgery produced a results address containing those words.

The findings state that NYP used the Meta, Google and Trade Desk tools to target ads, for example using the Meta tool to build custom audiences from visits to orthopedics pages and lookalike audiences from visits to prostate cancer pages. They also state that NYP had no business associate agreements with those companies and lacked appropriate policies for vetting third-party tracking tools. After a journalist asked about the tools in early June 2022, NYP had taken steps to disable them by June 16, 2022, when the article was published, and it reported a breach to HHS on March 20, 2023. The Attorney General's announcement said NYP reported that the incident affected over 54,000 people.

The Attorney General found violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and New York Executive Law § 63(12), and NYP neither admitted nor denied the findings. NYP signed the Assurance on December 20, 2023, and the Attorney General's office on December 26, 2023; it was announced on December 27, 2023 and took effect on January 15, 2024.

What the agency did

  1. The Attorney General found that NYP is a HIPAA covered entity and that the information it shared with third parties included protected health information. It found that NYP's conduct violated the HIPAA Privacy Rule's disclosure and safeguards provisions and New York Executive Law § 63(12). (Assurance No. 23-066 paras. 15-16, at 5)

    The information NYP shared with third parties included HIPAA protected health information (“PHI”).

    Assurance No. 23-066 para. 15, at 5
  2. The Assurance treats tracking on public pages about specific symptoms or conditions, or for searching for doctors or scheduling appointments, as able to reach protected health information. It ties that statement to HHS's December 2022 guidance, until the relevant portion is amended, superseded, withdrawn or rejected by a court ruling applicable to New York covered entities or to HHS. (Assurance No. 23-066 para. 22, at 6-7)

    Respondent is disclosing protected health information when tracking tools collect an individual’s email address or IP address on a webpage where an individual searches for available appointments with a health care provider.

    Assurance No. 23-066 para. 22, at 7
  3. NYP must clearly disclose on each website and app every third party that receives protected health information through a pixel, tag or other online tool, with a description of the information received. (Assurance No. 23-066 para. 23, at 7)

    clearly disclose all Third Parties that receive Protected Health Information as the result of a pixel, tag, or other online tool

    Assurance No. 23-066 para. 23, at 7
  4. Within 30 days of the effective date, NYP had to instruct every third party that received protected health information to delete it and to confirm the deletion in writing. (Assurance No. 23-066 para. 24, at 7)

    instruct all Third Parties that received Protected Health Information to delete any Protected Health Information and provide written confirmation that any identified Protected Health Information has been deleted.

    Assurance No. 23-066 para. 24, at 7
  5. NYP must keep policies governing tracking tools, audit or test each tool and its contracts, privacy policies and terms before deployment and regularly afterward, obtain an independent assessment identifying all tools and the data they may have sent, and train responsible staff; the policy, audit and training duties expire seven years after the effective date. (Assurance No. 23-066 paras. 25-29, 42, at 8-9, 12)

    Respondent shall not deploy a tool unless its deployment complies with Respondent’s policies and procedures and this Assurance.

    Assurance No. 23-066 para. 26, at 8
  6. NYP agreed to pay the State of New York $300,000 within 14 days of the January 15, 2024 effective date. (Assurance No. 23-066 paras. 30, 52, at 9, 13)

  7. NYP neither admitted nor denied the findings, and the Assurance states that it is not an admission of liability. NYP agreed not to make public statements denying the findings or suggesting the Assurance lacks a legal or factual basis, while keeping its right to take positions in litigation to which the Attorney General is not a party. (Assurance No. 23-066 paras. 17, 34, 44, at 5, 10, 12)

    Respondent neither admits nor denies the NYAG’s findings, paragraphs 1-16 above.

    Assurance No. 23-066 para. 17, at 5

What it did not decide

  • No court ruled on the findings; the Attorney General accepted the Assurance instead of starting a court proceeding.
  • The Assurance does not address the federal Wiretap Act or state wiretap statutes. It states that it is not intended for use by any third party in any other proceeding and that it does not deprive anyone of a private right under the law.
  • Signed before HHS revised its guidance in March 2024 and before the June 2024 court ruling on that guidance, the Assurance does not address how those events affect its statement about public pages.

The tracking involved

Tools

  • Bing
  • DoubleClick
  • Meta/Facebook pixel
  • Google
  • iHeartMedia
  • TikTok
  • The Trade Desk
  • Twitter

Data

  • IP addresses
  • Addresses of pages loaded and links clicked, sometimes naming a doctor or condition
  • Site search words carried in results page addresses
  • Cookie-based unique identifiers
  • Names, email and mailing addresses and gender entered on pages with the Meta pixel

How it bears on website tracking claims

Supports: strengthens a website tracking claim on this issue. Limits: narrows or defeats a website tracking claim on this issue. Context: bears on the issue without deciding it either way.

  • Context: HIPAA

    How HIPAA, its criminal provision at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 and HHS guidance bear on tracking.

    For a HIPAA covered hospital, the Attorney General treated pixel data from its public website, including IP addresses paired with page addresses that showed a doctor or condition, as protected health information and found a Privacy Rule violation (Assurance paras. 5-6, 15). The findings also faulted the lack of business associate agreements with the receiving companies and of appropriate policies for vetting tracking tools (paras. 8-9). NYP neither admitted nor denied the findings, and no court reviewed them.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Context: Health information

    What counts as individually identifiable health information when it is sent through tracking tools.

    The findings describe how health information reached third parties through page addresses: a site search for spine surgery produced a results address containing those words, and appointment links could reveal the doctor (para. 6). They also describe advertising audiences built from visits to orthopedics and prostate cancer pages (para. 7). These are findings by a state enforcer about one hospital, not a court's ruling on what counts as health information.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Limits: Health information

    What counts as individually identifiable health information when it is sent through tracking tools.

    Paragraph 22's statement that tracking on public condition, doctor-search and scheduling pages may reach protected health information was tied to HHS's December 2022 guidance (para. 22). The tie lasts until the relevant portion is amended, superseded or withdrawn, or rejected by a court ruling applicable to New York covered entities or to HHS. HHS revised the guidance in March 2024, and in June 2024 a federal court vacated its treatment of an IP address combined with a visit to a public page about specific conditions or providers (American Hospital Association v. Becerra, ECF No. 67 at 31). The Assurance's own example, an email or IP address collected where a person searches for available appointments, involves a scheduling search rather than a page visit alone.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Context: Agency penalties and orders

    Civil penalties, payments and conduct terms that regulators obtained.

    The Assurance requires a $300,000 payment to the State under its Monetary Relief heading, and its tool policy, audit and training duties run for seven years (paras. 30, 42). The Attorney General's announcement said the reported incident affected over 54,000 people.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Context: Consumer protection

    Deception and unfair practice claims, such as under the FTC Act and N.Y. General Business Law § 349.

    The Attorney General investigated under New York Executive Law § 63(12) and found a violation of it alongside the HIPAA violations (paras. 15-16). The findings do not include a conclusion that NYP's privacy statements were misleading, but the Assurance bars NYP from misrepresenting how it protects the privacy, security or confidentiality of protected health information (para. 20).

    All tracker entries on this issue

Arguments it addresses

A page address is not health information
The Attorney General found that page addresses sent with IP addresses sometimes named the doctor or condition, as when a search for spine surgery produced a results address containing those words, and that the shared information included protected health information.
The tracking was never on the patient portal
The Assurance notes the tools were not deployed in the patient portal, yet its findings concerned public pages used for doctor searches, condition research and appointment scheduling.
The data was used only for the hospital's own advertising
The findings state that NYP used the data to target its own ads through custom and lookalike audiences, and that some vendors' standard terms let them use the health information for their own business purposes with no business associate agreements in place.
AHA v. Becerra removed this theory
The Assurance predates the ruling and tied its public-page statement to HHS's 2022 guidance unless that guidance changed or a court rejected it, and the ruling vacated only the later bulletin's part on IP addresses combined with visits to public condition or provider pages.
A settlement is not an admission
NYP neither admitted nor denied the findings, and the Assurance says it is not an admission of liability or meant for third parties' use in other proceedings, though NYP agreed not to deny the findings publicly.

For a company that received a letter

  • The Assurance is a negotiated resolution with a state Attorney General; its findings were neither admitted nor denied and were not reviewed by a court.
  • It states that it is not intended for use by any third party in any other proceeding, and that it does not deprive anyone of a private right under the law.
  • Its findings show what a state enforcer focused on: search and appointment page addresses, cookie identifiers, audiences built from health pages, missing business associate agreements and no vetting of tracking tools before they were deployed.

What to check on your own site

  • Run a test search on your site and check whether the results page address contains the words you typed.
  • Check which tags fire on condition pages, doctor searches and appointment links, and whether they send the full page address.
  • Check whether each vendor whose tag runs on those pages is bound by terms that limit its use of the data, such as a business associate agreement.

Later history

After the Assurance took effect, HHS revised its tracking bulletin on March 18, 2024. On June 20, 2024, in American Hospital Association v. Becerra, a federal court vacated the revised bulletin's treatment of an IP address combined with a visit to an unauthenticated public page about specific health conditions or providers, and the Fifth Circuit dismissed HHS's appeal on HHS's motion on September 4, 2024. Paragraph 22 of the Assurance ties its public-page statement to the December 2022 guidance unless the relevant portion is amended, superseded, withdrawn, revoked or replaced, or is enjoined or rejected by a court ruling applicable to covered entities in New York State or to HHS.

March 18, 2024 · Agency actionOnline Tracking Technologies Bulletin (HHS 2024)GuidanceHHS's revised bulletin says HIPAA-regulated entities may not let tracking technologies impermissibly disclose protected health information to vendors; a court later vacated only its part on IP addresses and public pages about conditions or providers.June 20, 2024 · Court rulingAmerican Hospital Association v. Becerra (N.D. Tex. 2024)For plaintiffsA Texas federal court vacated only the part of HHS's tracking guidance treating an IP address plus a visit to a public page about specific health conditions or providers as individually identifiable health information.July 20, 2023 · Agency actionJoint Letters on Online Tracking (FTC and HHS 2023)GuidanceThe FTC and HHS's Office for Civil Rights warned approximately 130 hospital systems and telehealth providers that tracking technologies such as the Meta/Facebook pixel and Google Analytics may impermissibly disclose health information.July 30, 2024 · Court rulingCooper v. Mount Sinai Health System (S.D.N.Y. 2024)For plaintiffsA federal court let a Wiretap Act claim over a health system's Meta Pixel proceed, holding that alleged disclosure of identifiable patient health information for commercial ends plausibly invoked the crime-tort exception through HIPAA.September 16, 2024 · Court rulingGay v. Garnet Health (S.D.N.Y. 2024)Mixed rulingPatients' Wiretap Act claim against their hospital survived dismissal because they plausibly alleged it intended to send their identifiable health information to Facebook without consent for commercial purposes, a disclosure HIPAA makes a crime.March 19, 2024 · Court rulingKane v. University of Rochester (W.D.N.Y. 2024)Mixed rulingA Schedule an Appointment click on a physician's profile, sent to Facebook with the user's Facebook ID, was plausibly individually identifiable health information, so a Wiretap Act claim proceeded under the crime-tort exception.

Published by Privacy Resolve from public records. It does not cover our own matters.

General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.