· Court ruling
Kane v. University of Rochester
U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, No. 6:23-cv-06027-FPG, ECF No. 24
Primary source: Decision and order. Checked on November 10, 2026.
A Schedule an Appointment click on a physician's profile, sent to Facebook with the user's Facebook ID, was plausibly individually identifiable health information, so a Wiretap Act claim proceeded under the crime-tort exception.
What happened
Two patients, Carol Kane of Florida and Bonnie Wilson of New York, sued the University of Rochester, which operates one of the largest medical treatment and research facilities in New York. They alleged that the University used two Facebook tools, the Facebook Tracking Pixel and the Conversions Application Programming Interface (CAPI), to send their private health-related information to Facebook through its website (ECF No. 24 at 1-2).
According to the complaint, the pixel sent Facebook the filters and keywords a visitor entered on the Find a Provider page, the physician profile the visitor selected and the visitor's location, and it reported a click on a physician's Schedule an Appointment button as a SubscribedButtonClick event, together with the visitor's Facebook ID from the c_user cookie and other identifiers (at 3-4, 10-11).
Both plaintiffs alleged that they used the website to schedule doctor's appointments and used the same devices to access active Facebook accounts; Wilson also used the patient portal (at 6). The University's Privacy Statement said that the website does not allow any third party to track or collect personally identifiable information from users, and its Notice of Privacy Practices said that, apart from limited marketing such as face-to-face communication, it would obtain authorization for marketing activities (at 5-6).
The decision was issued by Judge Frank P. Geraci, Jr. on March 19, 2024 (at 37).
What the court held
In response to the motion, the plaintiffs withdrew their invasion of privacy claim, a second Wiretap Act claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a), and their Stored Communications Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claims, and the court dismissed those claims without prejudice. (ECF No. 24 at 8, 37)
Because the University's status as a party to the communications was undisputed, the remaining Wiretap Act claim turned on the crime-tort exception, which courts in the Second Circuit construe narrowly and which requires a purpose to commit a crime or tort independent of the act of recording. (ECF No. 24 at 8-9, 9 n.3)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant was a party to the communications.
ECF No. 24 at 9 n.3 The court found it plausible that, at the very least, the information sent when a user tries to schedule an appointment with a physician is individually identifiable health information under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6), because it was received by a health care provider, relates to the provision of care and can be linked to a Facebook profile. (ECF No. 24 at 10-12)
Here, however, because Defendant’s website transmits data from which it is possible to identify a specific individual who is seeking treatment from a specific physician, the information does relate to the provision of healthcare to an individual.
ECF No. 24 at 12 The court rejected the argument that the transmissions were an unreadable jumble of code that differed from actual medical records. (ECF No. 24 at 11)
While the transmitted data may look “scrambled up” to a human reader, to an individual or entity with the tools to analyze that data, it is perfectly comprehensible.
ECF No. 24 at 11 The court distinguished Smith v. Facebook, where pages of general health information available to the public were held not to relate to an individual's health, and the July 24, 2023 ruling in Kurowski v. Rush System for Health, where the allegations described only metadata. (ECF No. 24 at 12-13)
Allegations that the University disclosed the information to enhance its marketing plausibly pleaded a purpose to commit a crime under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, so the Wiretap Act claim could proceed, although the court said the University may be able to show otherwise on the facts. (ECF No. 24 at 14-15)
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendant’s purpose was to commit an act that is punishable as a crime under 42 U.S.C § 1320d-6: knowingly disclosing IIHI without authorization for marketing purposes.
ECF No. 24 at 15 The express contract claim proceeded on promises in the University's Privacy Statement, and the court declined to enforce the statement's sole-remedy clause at the pleading stage because the complaint alleged an intentional or grossly negligent breach. (ECF No. 24 at 16-19)
The implied contract and fiduciary duty claims were dismissed as duplicative of the breach of confidence claim, while the bailment claim proceeded. (ECF No. 24 at 19-23, 28-30)
The breach of confidence claim was dismissed with leave to amend, because the scheduling information was not shown to relate to treatment rendered or a diagnosis made and the patient portal allegations did not identify what was sent from inside the portal. (ECF No. 24 at 23-28)
But that information, without more, does not appear to be within the scope of Defendant’s duty of confidentiality.
ECF No. 24 at 27 The unjust enrichment claim proceeded on a lost benefit-of-the-bargain theory, although the court held that allegations of diminished data value were too general. (ECF No. 24 at 30-32)
The General Business Law § 349 claim proceeded: the Privacy Statement was consumer-oriented, its statements about third-party tracking were plausibly misleading given what the pixel allegedly sent, the plaintiffs alleged a lost benefit of the bargain, and their detailed description of the statement supported an inference that they saw it. (ECF No. 24 at 32-36)
That is enough to make it plausible that Defendant’s representation would mislead a reasonable consumer.
ECF No. 24 at 34
What it did not decide
- Whether information other than the appointment scheduling data, such as provider searches, page views or activity inside the patient portal, is individually identifiable health information; the court addressed the scheduling information, which it found plausible at the very least (ECF No. 24 at 11).
- Whether the University in fact intercepted the communications for a marketing purpose; the court said it may be able to show, as a factual matter, that it did not (at 15).
- Whether disclosing the information to Facebook was a separate act from the interception; the order recites the independence requirement but does not discuss it further (at 9, 14-15).
- What information, if any, the pixel collected inside the patient portal (at 27-28).
- Contested class certification, damages and liability; the case settled, and the court certified a class only for settlement purposes (ECF No. 64 at 5-6).
The tracking involved
Tools
- Facebook Tracking Pixel (Meta Pixel)
- Conversions Application Programming Interface (CAPI)
Data
- Find a Provider search filters and keywords, such as specialty and physician gender
- The physician profile selected
- Schedule an Appointment clicks, sent as SubscribedButtonClick events
- Visitor location, including an address entered to find a nearby physician
- Facebook ID from the c_user cookie, fr and _fbp cookies, IP address and device ID
How it bears on website tracking claims
Supports: strengthens a website tracking claim on this issue. Limits: narrows or defeats a website tracking claim on this issue. Context: bears on the issue without deciding it either way.
Context: Party exception
Whether the website, as a party to the visit, could consent to the tracking under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
Because the plaintiffs did not dispute that the University was a party to their communications with its website, the federal claim depended on the crime-tort exception. The court applied the Second Circuit's rule from Caro v. Weintraub that the purpose must be to commit a crime or tort independent of the act of recording, and it noted that courts in the circuit read the exception narrowly.
Supports: Crime-tort exception
Whether a communication was intercepted for the purpose of a criminal or tortious act, which removes the party exception.
The court accepted 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, which makes it a crime to knowingly disclose individually identifiable health information in violation of HIPAA's Administrative Simplification provisions, as the predicate, and held that allegations of disclosure to enhance marketing plausibly pleaded that purpose. It relied in part on the December 11, 2023 ruling in Kurowski v. Rush System for Health. The ruling leaves the University free to prove a different purpose on the facts.
Supports: Health information
What counts as individually identifiable health information when it is sent through tracking tools.
The court held that a scheduling click on a specific physician's profile, sent with a Facebook ID, plausibly relates to the provision of health care to an identifiable person, and it distinguished pages of general health information available to the public. The holding is limited to that scheduling information. In the same order, the court said this information, without more, did not appear to fall within the provider's duty of confidentiality under New York law, so the breach of confidence claim was dismissed with leave to amend.
Supports: HIPAA
How HIPAA, its criminal provision at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 and HHS guidance bear on tracking.
The order applies HIPAA's statutory definition of individually identifiable health information, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6), to website data for the crime-tort analysis, and it treats coded transmissions as readable by a recipient with the tools to analyze them. The order does not cite HHS's guidance on tracking technologies.
Supports: Consumer protection
Deception and unfair practice claims, such as under the FTC Act and N.Y. General Business Law § 349.
The General Business Law § 349 claim survived because the Privacy Statement said the website did not allow third parties to track or collect personally identifiable information and that such data would not be associated with other data gathered on the site, while the pixel allegedly linked Facebook IDs to provider searches. The court accepted a lost benefit-of-the-bargain theory of injury and inferred from the detailed allegations that the plaintiffs saw the statements. The analysis rests on the specific promises in this privacy statement.
Arguments it addresses
- The website was a party to the communication
- That was undisputed, but the court held the crime-tort exception plausibly applied because the alleged purpose was a knowing disclosure of health information for marketing (ECF No. 24 at 9 n.3, 15).
- The purpose was to see how well the website communicates, not to harm anyone
- The court rejected this at the pleading stage, holding that allegations of disclosure to enhance marketing plausibly pleaded a purpose to commit a crime under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (at 8, 14-15).
- The data was coded and unreadable
- The court said data that looks scrambled to a human reader is perfectly comprehensible to an entity with the tools to analyze it (at 11).
- A page visit is not health information
- The court distinguished general health pages but held that a scheduling click tied to a specific physician and a Facebook ID plausibly relates to the provision of care to an identifiable person (at 11-13).
- The privacy statement limits the university's liability
- The court declined to enforce the Privacy Statement's sole-remedy clause on the pleadings because the complaint alleged an intentional or grossly negligent breach (at 18-19).
- The plaintiffs never read the privacy statement
- For the General Business Law § 349 claim, the court inferred from the detailed description of the statement that the plaintiffs saw it (at 35-36).
- No concrete injury
- A lost benefit of the bargain, paying for services the plaintiffs say they would not have bought had they known of the disclosures, sufficed for unjust enrichment and § 349, though the court found the allegations of diminished data value too general for unjust enrichment (at 30-32, 34-35).
For a company that received a letter
- The federal ruling rested on a specific event, a scheduling click on a physician's profile sent with a Facebook ID, not on page views generally.
- The court compared the privacy statement's promises with what the pixel allegedly sent, and that comparison carried both the express contract claim and the General Business Law § 349 claim.
- This was a pleading-stage ruling; the case later settled, with final approval on August 21, 2025, so the allegations were never tested at trial.
What to check on your own site
- Check which events fire when a visitor clicks a scheduling button or a phone number on a physician profile, and what parameters those events carry.
- Check whether provider search filters and keywords appear in page addresses or event data sent to advertising vendors.
- Compare each statement in your privacy statement about third-party tracking with what your tags actually send.
Later history
The case settled. The court granted final approval of the class settlement on August 21, 2025 (ECF No. 64) and entered judgment the next day (ECF No. 65). On September 28, 2026, it enjoined a company that had taken assignments of 389 class members' claims, and had sued the University's medical center separately on the same Wiretap Act claim, from prosecuting any claim barred by the settlement (ECF No. 88).
Sources
- Decision and order, ECF No. 24 (March 19, 2024)
- Decision and order, ECF No. 24 (Internet Archive copy)
- Final approval order, ECF No. 64 (August 21, 2025)
- Order and opinion enforcing the settlement, ECF No. 88 (September 28, 2026)
- Court docket, including the judgment entered August 22, 2025 (ECF No. 65), CourtListener copy
Related rulings
Published by Privacy Resolve from public records. It does not cover our own matters.
General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.