Terms that cap what a person can recover are common in contracts written by one side, including the terms of use on many websites. Companies defend them by pointing out that a claimant can still recover something. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., decided by the full Sixth Circuit, rejects that framing. The question, the court said, is not whether some remedy remains, but whether the limitation undermines the rights the statute protects.
The case at a glance
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), Nos. 99-4099 and 99-5897, heard together with a companion appeal, Shankle v. Pep Boys. Decided January 30, 2003, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc.
Capped remedies and shared costs
Two employees challenged arbitration agreements their employers required. The first agreement limited what an arbitrator could award on a discrimination claim: it capped back pay and front pay and tied punitive damages to those capped amounts or a small fixed sum, below what federal employment discrimination law allows. It also required the employee to share the costs of arbitration. The second agreement, in the companion case, required the employee to pay part of the arbitrator's fees.
What the court held
The limits on damages were unenforceable. "We also conclude that the limitations that the Circuit City arbitration agreement places on the damages a claimant may recover from arbitration are unenforceable." 317 F.3d at 670.
The test. "The critical question is not whether a claimant may obtain some amount of the entire range of remedies under Title VII, but whether the limitation on remedies at issue undermines the rights protected by the statute." Id.
Applied to the punitive damages cap. The court found that the cap "eviscerates Congress's intent to utilize punitive damages as a tool for combating discrimination," id. at 672, and concluded: "we hold that the provision at issue in this case was not enforceable." Id. at 673.
Severance, not collapse. Where an agreement has a severability clause, the court said, "courts should not lightly conclude that a particular provision of an arbitration agreement taints the entire agreement." Id. at 675. It treated the cost-splitting term and the remedy limits as severable. Because the arbitration in the first case had already taken place without either term being applied, the court affirmed the order sending that claim to arbitration on these different grounds. In the companion case, it removed the fee-sharing term: "That provision was not interwoven with the rest of the agreement and may be deleted without affecting the rest of the agreement's provisions regarding arbitration." Id. at 677.
Why it matters when website terms cap a privacy claim
The court's test is functional. It asks what the statute is for and whether the limit gets in the way. The court identified two purposes in the employment statute, making injured people whole and deterring future violations, and found that the cap on punitive damages defeated the second.
Privacy statutes are built the same way. They provide compensation, and many also provide statutory damages and punitive damages so that violations are not cheaper than compliance. The federal Wiretap Act, for example, allows statutory damages and punitive damages in appropriate cases; our guide to its damages provision quotes the text. A website's terms might say that its liability is limited to what the visitor paid, which for a free website can mean nothing at all. Measured against this test, a limit like that does not merely trim a remedy; it removes the deterrent the statute was written to create.
The decision also speaks to cost. The court found that requiring the first employee to split the costs of arbitration would deter a substantial number of people in her position from pursuing their rights, and refused to enforce that term against her (317 F.3d at 668-70). A clause that makes a consumer pay to bring a privacy claim raises the same concern.
What the company argued, and how the court answered
The size of the remaining remedy. The company argued that its limits did not undermine the statute because the employee might recover as much under the agreement as in court. The court worked through the agreement's terms, found that the comparison was wrong, and held that the test is whether the limitation undermines the statute's rights, not whether some recovery remains (317 F.3d at 670-72).
Severance. The remaining question was whether the unenforceable terms took the whole agreement down with them. The court used the agreement's own severability clause to remove the offending terms and keep the rest, so that claims could proceed in arbitration on lawful terms.
A telling detail. By the time of the appeal, the company had removed the limitation on remedies from its arbitration agreement and acknowledged that it was unenforceable (317 F.3d at 674). The court still decided the question, because the version that applied to the employee contained it.
Subsequent history
None. No later order in the case disturbs the en banc decision.
Read the opinion
Related case notes: Hadnot v. Bay and Mitsubishi v. Soler.
Checked on November 10, 2026.
Privacy Resolve is not a law firm, and this is not legal advice.