Many websites' terms of use say that disputes must go to arbitration rather than court. People reading those terms often assume that agreeing to arbitrate means giving up the claim, or at least the remedies the law provides. The Supreme Court addressed that assumption in 1985, in a case about cars rather than websites, and its answer has anchored arbitration law ever since: arbitration changes where a statutory claim is decided, not what the statute gives the person bringing it.
The case at a glance
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), No. 83-1569. Decided July 2, 1985, by the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun.
A car dealer, antitrust claims and an arbitration in Japan
A Puerto Rico car dealer had a sales agreement with a Japanese manufacturer requiring that certain disputes be arbitrated in Japan. When sales slowed and the relationship broke down, the manufacturer went to federal court to compel arbitration. The dealer counterclaimed, including under the federal antitrust laws, and argued that antitrust claims were too important to be decided by arbitrators. The Court held that the antitrust claims, arising from an international commercial transaction, could be sent to arbitration under the agreement.
What the Court held, and the principle it rested on
The holding favored arbitration, but the Court reached it by stating a principle that protects anyone who brings a statutory claim in arbitration:
"By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 473 U.S. at 628.
The Court tied its confidence in arbitration to the ability of a claimant to use the statute fully: "And so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function." Id. at 637.
In a footnote, the Court went further and described what it would not tolerate: "We merely note that in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy." Id. at 637 n.19. That footnote did not decide the case, and later decisions describe it as dictum, but it shows the line the Court drew between choosing a forum and stripping a remedy.
Why it matters when website terms send privacy claims to arbitration
Privacy statutes give people specific rights and remedies. The federal Wiretap Act, for example, provides for statutory damages, punitive damages in appropriate cases and attorney's fees, as our guide to its damages provision explains. Where an arbitration clause applies, it determines where such a claim is heard. Under the principle at page 628, it does not by itself take those remedies away.
That principle is the starting point for the lower-court decisions that refuse to enforce arbitration terms barring remedies a statute provides. The Fifth Circuit quoted page 628 when it upheld the removal of a ban on punitive damages in Hadnot v. Bay, and the Sixth Circuit applied the same idea to a damages cap in Morrison v. Circuit City. The common thread is the distinction this decision drew: a company may ask for a different forum, but the forum has to be one where the statutory claim can be pursued in full.
For a person whose health searches or page visits were sent to third parties, the practical lesson is to read an arbitration clause for two separate things. One is where the claim goes. The other is whether the clause tries to limit what can be recovered. The first may be enforceable; the second is where this principle does its work.
What companies argue, and how the Court's reasoning answers it
Limits on the claim. Companies sometimes treat an agreement to arbitrate as acceptance of every limit the clause places on the claim. The Court's answer is that agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim is agreeing to a forum, not surrendering "the substantive rights afforded by the statute."
Whether arbitrators apply the statute. The Court expected the arbitral tribunal to decide the antitrust claims under the law that created them, and it noted that courts asked to enforce an award could confirm that the tribunal took up those claims and decided them (473 U.S. at 636-38).
The dealer's own argument, that statutory claims of public importance cannot be arbitrated at all, lost. The Court enforced the agreement. What it preserved was the statute's substance inside the arbitration.
Subsequent history
None. This is a decision of the Supreme Court, and it has not been overruled. The Court has repeated the statement at page 628 in later arbitration decisions, and later decisions treat footnote 19 as dictum rather than a holding.
Read the opinion
Related case notes: Booker v. Robert Half and Brown v. Dillard's.
Checked on November 10, 2026.
Privacy Resolve is not a law firm, and this is not legal advice.