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· Court ruling

A.D. v. Aspen Dental Management, Inc.

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:24-cv-01404, ECF No. 47

Mixed rulingMotion to dismiss granted in part and denied in part at the pleading stage; the Wiretap Act, Florida, California and Pennsylvania wiretap and negligence claims survived

Primary source: Memorandum opinion and order. Checked on November 10, 2026.

An Illinois federal court let a Wiretap Act claim over a dental website's tracking proceed, holding a marketing purpose could not be detached from the alleged disclosure of health information, but dismissed several state claims.

What happened

According to the complaint, Aspen Dental Management, Inc. is a dental service organization that provides business support services to dentists, including maintaining aspendental.com, where visitors can search for information about dental conditions, locate providers and schedule appointments and procedures. Twelve plaintiffs sued in the Northern District of Illinois for a nationwide class and statewide classes in Illinois, Florida, Massachusetts, Washington, California and Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 47 at 1-2.)

The complaint alleged that Aspen used tracking pixels, first-party cookies and conversions API tools to send users' personally identifiable and protected health information to third parties such as Meta and Google; the opinion also names Bing. It alleged that when a user loaded a page or submitted a search, the pixels duplicated the request and sent it to the third party with its content and the user's identity, and that they were configured to collect patient status, appointments, providers, conditions and treatments, sent with IP addresses and Facebook IDs. (ECF No. 47 at 1-2.)

The complaint alleged that Aspen installed the tools to increase its profits through targeted advertising based on the health information users entered. Before the ruling, the plaintiffs withdrew their invasion of privacy, implied contract and Massachusetts consumer protection claims. The court took the remaining allegations as true at the pleading stage. (ECF No. 47 at 2-4.)

What the court held

  1. The court denied dismissal of the Wiretap Act count. It distinguished Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., where the exception did not reach a later misuse of a recording, because the plaintiffs alleged that Aspen placed the tracking technology on its website with the intent to collect and disclose users' health information for financial gain, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6. (ECF No. 47 at 4-6)

    Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage, Aspen placed tracking technology on its website with the intent to collect and disclose users’ personal health information for purposes of financial gain

    ECF No. 47 at 5
  2. The court held that the alleged transmissions of patient status, medical conditions, appointments, treatments and specific providers, together with the plaintiffs' accounts of their own use of the site, plausibly alleged that Aspen disclosed information about their health conditions and treatments, and that such information is individually identifiable health information under HIPAA. (ECF No. 47 at 5-6)

    Such information qualifies as IIHI for purposes of HIPAA.

    ECF No. 47 at 6
  3. The court rejected Aspen's argument that its only purpose was to improve its marketing and revenue. (ECF No. 47 at 6)

    Aspen claims that its only purpose was to improve its marketing and boost its revenues, but this purpose cannot be detached from the reality that Aspen achieved this improved marketing and revenue boost by disclosing Plaintiffs IIHI.

    ECF No. 47 at 6
  4. The court did not adopt the argument that the crime or tort must be distinct from the interception, noting that Aspen cited no precedential authority for it and that the court knew of none. In the alternative, it held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged an intended HIPAA violation in the transmission to third parties, which it described as distinct from the interception. (ECF No. 47 at 6)

    Even if the crime-tort exception did require an act distinct from the alleged wiretapping, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Aspen intended to violate the HIPAA when it transmitted Plaintiffs’ information to third parties

    ECF No. 47 at 6
  5. The court dismissed the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute count. It held that Aspen's alleged status as a party was not fatal under the provision the plaintiffs invoked, but that the statute's definition of "private conversation" covers oral communications, not the electronic communications at issue. (ECF No. 47 at 7-8)

    For the purposes of this motion and based on the briefing before the Court, the Court concludes that 720 ILCS 5/14-1(d) does not apply to the electronic communications about which Plaintiffs complain.

    ECF No. 47 at 8
  6. The court dismissed the Massachusetts Wiretap Act count under that statute's ordinary course of business exclusion, reasoning that the complaint itself alleged the website routinely sent users' information to third parties to generate revenue and that targeted marketing through online tracking is pervasive. (ECF No. 47 at 8-9)

    Targeted marketing, facilitated by tracking one’s online activity, is so pervasive that it is “apt to be known” and is properly considered within the bounds of Aspen’s ordinary course of business.

    ECF No. 47 at 9
  7. The court let the Florida Security of Communications Act, California Invasion of Privacy Act and Pennsylvania Wiretap Act counts proceed. Looking to federal law on the meaning of contents, it held that URLs containing terms entered into search fields and fillable forms plausibly carried contents rather than mere record information. (ECF No. 47 at 9-11, 14)

    This is sufficient to plausibly allege that covered “content” was intercepted.

    ECF No. 47 at 11
  8. Absent contrary authority, the court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the tracking technology was a device and that their data was an electronic communication under the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes, that the Pennsylvania interception occurred on users' browsers in Pennsylvania, and that the California plaintiff's communications were intercepted in transit. (ECF No. 47 at 11-14)

    Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Aspen’s interception occurred on Plaintiffs’ browser, located in Pennsylvania.

    ECF No. 47 at 13
  9. The court dismissed the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Washington Consumer Protection Act and California Unfair Competition Law counts because the plaintiffs did not plead an economic loss. It rejected their benefit-of-the-bargain and diminished-data-value theories under the Illinois act, and it dismissed unjust enrichment because that claim rested on the same conduct as the failed Illinois consumer fraud claim. (ECF No. 47 at 14-16, 19)

    Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ benefit of the bargain theory does not plausibly allege a monetary loss for purposes of the ICFA.

    ECF No. 47 at 16
  10. The court dismissed the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act count, holding that allegations that third parties learned which treatment a user searched for, priced or scheduled did not show that the California plaintiff's own medical information was disclosed, because a person may search for a partner, parent or child, or for treatment that person does not need. (ECF No. 47 at 16-17)

    That third parties were apprised of which medical care a specific user was looking for is not enough to sustain a claim under the CMIA.

    ECF No. 47 at 17
  11. The court let the negligence count proceed, holding that the complaint plausibly alleged a duty to prevent disclosure of private health information, based on Aspen's alleged representations that it would not disclose users' information without consent and on the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act. (ECF No. 47 at 18)

    Thus, the complaint plausibly alleges a duty to prevent the disclosure of their private health information.

    ECF No. 47 at 18

What it did not decide

  • Whether Aspen, which the court described as a dental service organization providing business support services to dentists, is itself a health care provider or HIPAA covered entity; the opinion quotes HIPAA's definition but does not discuss that element (ECF No. 47 at 1, 5-6).
  • Whether Aspen actually acted with the alleged intent; the ruling accepted the allegations as true (ECF No. 47 at 5).
  • Whether the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute reaches these communications on fuller briefing; the court limited its ruling to the briefing before it and noted that neither party cited a construction of the statute by an Illinois appellate court (ECF No. 47 at 8).
  • Whether software is a device, and whether form and search entries are electronic communications, under the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes as settled law; the court called both questions unsettled and ruled on the allegations absent contrary authority (ECF No. 47 at 11-13).
  • Article III standing, class certification and statutory damages; the opinion does not address them.

The tracking involved

Tools

  • Tracking pixels (recipients named include Meta, Google and Bing)
  • First-party cookies
  • Conversions API (CAPI) tools

Data

  • page requests and URLs
  • search terms and form entries
  • patient status
  • appointments and providers
  • medical conditions and treatments
  • IP addresses
  • Facebook IDs

How it bears on website tracking claims

Supports: strengthens a website tracking claim on this issue. Limits: narrows or defeats a website tracking claim on this issue. Context: bears on the issue without deciding it either way.

  • Context: Party exception

    Whether the website, as a party to the visit, could consent to the tracking under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).

    Aspen argued that it was a party to its users' communications with its own website (ECF No. 47 at 4-5). The court did not decide that point for the Wiretap Act count; it held that the crime-tort exception was plausibly alleged, which takes the claim outside the party exception at the pleading stage (ECF No. 47 at 5-6). Under the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute, it held that Aspen's alleged party status was not by itself fatal, because the provision invoked reaches a party who records without the consent of all other parties (ECF No. 47 at 7).

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Supports: Crime-tort exception

    Whether a communication was intercepted for the purpose of a criminal or tortious act, which removes the party exception.

    The court held the exception plausibly alleged where Aspen allegedly placed tracking technology intending to collect and disclose users' health information for financial gain in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (ECF No. 47 at 5-6). It rejected the profit-motive defense because the marketing benefit was allegedly achieved through the disclosure (ECF No. 47 at 6). On independence, it said it knew of no precedential authority requiring a separate act and held in the alternative that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged an intended HIPAA violation in the transmission to third parties, which it described as distinct from the interception, so its result does not depend on rejecting an independence rule (ECF No. 47 at 6).

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Supports: HIPAA

    How HIPAA, its criminal provision at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 and HHS guidance bear on tracking.

    The predicate was HIPAA's criminal provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, which the court described as imposing federal criminal liability on one who knowingly discloses individually identifiable health information to third parties (ECF No. 47 at 5). The court quoted HIPAA's definition, which covers information created or received by a health care provider, but did not discuss whether Aspen, a dental service organization, is one (ECF No. 47 at 1, 5). The opinion therefore does not resolve how the predicate applies to a website operator that the court described as providing business support services to dentists.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Supports: Health information

    What counts as individually identifiable health information when it is sent through tracking tools.

    At the pleading stage, the court treated alleged transmissions of patient status, conditions, appointments, treatments and specific providers, sent with identifiers, as individually identifiable health information (ECF No. 47 at 2, 6). It relied on the plaintiffs' accounts of their own use of the site. The same opinion took a narrower view under the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, where it held that allegations about which treatment a user searched for, priced or scheduled did not show the user's own condition or treatment (ECF No. 47 at 17).

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Supports: Contents

    Whether what was sent, such as page addresses, searches and clicks, counts as the contents of a communication.

    For the Florida, Pennsylvania and California claims, the court held that URLs containing terms entered into search fields and fillable forms plausibly carry contents rather than record information, following federal Wiretap Act decisions on the meaning of contents (ECF No. 47 at 9-11). It drew the line between URLs that only identify and address a page and URLs that carry a search term or similar communication by the user (ECF No. 47 at 10-11).

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Supports: Interception

    Whether a tracking tool acquired a communication as it was sent, who did it, and whether it was intentional.

    The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a device (the tracking technology) and electronic communications under the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes, while noting both questions are unsettled (ECF No. 47 at 11-13). It placed the alleged Pennsylvania interception on users' browsers in Pennsylvania (ECF No. 47 at 13). It also held that interception in transit was plausibly alleged under the California statute, treating Aspen's argument that two separate communications occur as a factual dispute (ECF No. 47 at 13-14).

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Supports: State wiretap laws

    State interception statutes, such as California Penal Code § 631 and the Washington Privacy Act.

    The Florida Security of Communications Act, California Invasion of Privacy Act and Pennsylvania Wiretap Act counts survived (ECF No. 47 at 9-14). The Pennsylvania ruling ties the claim to where the user's browser was, which matters for visitors located in that state (ECF No. 47 at 13).

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Limits: State wiretap laws

    State interception statutes, such as California Penal Code § 631 and the Washington Privacy Act.

    The Illinois Eavesdropping Statute count failed because the court read the provision invoked, which turns on a "private conversation," to cover oral communications only, a conclusion it limited to the briefing before it (ECF No. 47 at 7-8). The Massachusetts Wiretap Act count failed under the ordinary course of business exclusion, on the reasoning that targeted marketing through online tracking was part of Aspen's ordinary business (ECF No. 47 at 8-9).

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Limits: Consumer protection

    Deception and unfair practice claims, such as under the FTC Act and N.Y. General Business Law § 349.

    The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Washington Consumer Protection Act and California Unfair Competition Law counts failed for lack of a pleaded economic loss (ECF No. 47 at 14-16). The court rejected a benefit-of-the-bargain theory outside product-defect cases and said diminished value of personal data is not an actionable injury under the Illinois act (ECF No. 47 at 15-16). Under these three statutes, a privacy harm without an economic loss did not state a claim.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Limits: State privacy laws

    Other state privacy statutes and claims, such as medical information and health records acts and the CCPA.

    The California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act count failed because allegations that third parties learned which treatment a user searched for, priced or scheduled did not show disclosure of the plaintiff's own condition or treatment (ECF No. 47 at 16-17). The court reasoned that a person may search for a partner, parent or child, or for care that person does not need (ECF No. 47 at 17). The plaintiffs had withdrawn their invasion of privacy claim (ECF No. 47 at 4).

    All tracker entries on this issue

Arguments it addresses

The website was a party to the communication
For the Wiretap Act count the court did not need to decide party status because it held the crime-tort exception plausibly alleged, and under the Illinois statute it held party status was not by itself fatal (ECF No. 47 at 5-7).
The only purpose was marketing and revenue
The court held that this purpose could not be detached from the alleged means of achieving it, the disclosure of users' individually identifiable health information (ECF No. 47 at 6).
The crime or tort must be separate from the interception
The court said it knew of no precedential authority for that requirement and held in the alternative that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged an intended HIPAA violation in the transmission to third parties, which it described as distinct from the interception (ECF No. 47 at 6).
URLs and browsing data are not contents
For the Florida, Pennsylvania and California claims, the court held that URLs carrying terms entered into search fields and forms plausibly include contents (ECF No. 47 at 9-11).
The browser sends two separate communications, so nothing is intercepted in transit
The court treated this as a disagreement with the plaintiff's factual allegations and let the California claim proceed (ECF No. 47 at 13-14).
Tracking for targeted marketing is ordinary business
The court accepted this for the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, holding that targeted marketing facilitated by online tracking fell within Aspen's ordinary course of business (ECF No. 47 at 8-9).
A search for a treatment does not reveal the user's own condition
The court accepted this for the California medical information claim, while holding for the Wiretap Act count that the plaintiffs' accounts of their own use of the site plausibly alleged disclosure of their conditions and treatments (ECF No. 47 at 6, 17).
Privacy harm is not an economic loss
The court agreed for the Illinois, Washington and California consumer protection claims, which require an economic loss, and dismissed them (ECF No. 47 at 14-16).

For a company that received a letter

  • This was a ruling on the pleadings: the court took the complaint's allegations as true and made no finding that Aspen acted unlawfully.
  • The result differed by statute: the federal Wiretap Act and the Florida, California and Pennsylvania wiretap counts survived, while the Illinois and Massachusetts wiretap counts and three consumer protection counts did not.
  • The court located the alleged Pennsylvania interception on the user's browser, so where visitors are when they use a site was part of the analysis.
  • The claims later settled in Illinois state court, where Aspen denied wrongdoing in the settlement agreement and the court dismissed the action with prejudice on final approval.

What to check on your own site

  • Check whether page URLs sent to advertising or analytics vendors include search terms or form entries, since the court treated those as plausible contents.
  • Review which events fire on condition, provider search, pricing and appointment pages, and which identifiers, such as IP addresses or cookie IDs, travel with them.
  • Note which states your visitors use the site from, since the court placed the alleged interception on the visitor's browser.

Later history

The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, and on February 3, 2025 the parties jointly stipulated to dismiss the federal case without prejudice (ECF No. 69); the court entered the dismissal the next day (ECF No. 70). The claims were refiled on February 20, 2025 in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois, as Donnelly v. Aspen Dental Management, Inc., No. 2025LA000036, for a class settlement of a $2,796,169.50 non-reversionary fund plus up to $15,673,220, up to $18,469,389.50 in all, for people who made an appointment on aspendental.com from February 20, 2022 through January 1, 2025. The court granted final approval and dismissed the action on the merits with prejudice in a final order and judgment file-stamped October 20, 2025. Aspen denied wrongdoing in the settlement agreement, which also required it to use Freshpaint or a similar tool on aspendental.com for one year from the effective date or until a clarification of the law made that unnecessary.

July 30, 2024 · Court rulingCooper v. Mount Sinai Health System (S.D.N.Y. 2024)For plaintiffsA federal court let a Wiretap Act claim over a health system's Meta Pixel proceed, holding that alleged disclosure of identifiable patient health information for commercial ends plausibly invoked the crime-tort exception through HIPAA.September 16, 2024 · Court rulingGay v. Garnet Health (S.D.N.Y. 2024)Mixed rulingPatients' Wiretap Act claim against their hospital survived dismissal because they plausibly alleged it intended to send their identifiable health information to Facebook without consent for commercial purposes, a disclosure HIPAA makes a crime.July 24, 2023 · Court rulingKurowski v. Rush System for Health (N.D. Ill. 2023)Mixed rulingPatients' Wiretap Act claim was dismissed because the complaint plausibly alleged only metadata, not health information, but their Illinois Eavesdropping Act claim proceeded against the health system as a principal benefiting from third-party cookies.February 21, 2025 · Court rulingStein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health (N.D. Ill. 2025)Mixed rulingAn Illinois federal court held that a health care provider's alleged disclosure of patient information to Facebook in violation of HIPAA satisfies the crime-tort exception, even if done for profit; the question is on appeal.November 14, 2024 · Court rulingCastillo v. Costco Wholesale (W.D. Wash. 2024)Mixed rulingRuling on the pleadings, a Seattle federal court held pharmacy customers' prescription searches sent to Meta were contents and a financial motive does not defeat the crime-tort exception, but dismissed the Washington Privacy Act claim.September 7, 2023 · Court rulingDoe v. Meta Platforms (N.D. Cal. 2023)Mixed rulingPatients' Wiretap Act and CIPA claims against Meta over its pixel on health care providers' patient portals survived dismissal, with the scope of covered content, Meta's intent and the providers' consent left to evidence.

Published by Privacy Resolve from public records. It does not cover our own matters.

General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.