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· Court ruling

Stein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:23-cv-14515, ECF No. 53

Mixed rulingMotion to dismiss denied as to the Wiretap Act and negligence claims and granted as to the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute claim and five abandoned claims; reconsideration later denied and the question certified for interlocutory appeal

Primary source: Memorandum opinion and order. Checked on November 10, 2026.

An Illinois federal court held that a health care provider's alleged disclosure of patient information to Facebook in violation of HIPAA satisfies the crime-tort exception, even if done for profit; the question is on appeal.

What happened

Arnold Stein and Diane Miller sued Edward-Elmhurst Health, a health care provider with dozens of locations in Illinois, on behalf of a proposed class. The complaint alleged that they used the provider's website, which patients use to book appointments and communicate symptoms, and its MyChart portal, where users communicate with doctors, access test results and manage prescriptions and appointments, believing they were communicating only with their health care providers. (ECF No. 53 at 1, 3-4.)

The complaint alleged that the provider embedded the Meta Pixel on these web properties and that the Pixel sent users' clicks, keystrokes and details about their medical treatment to Facebook along with each user's Facebook ID. It also alleged that the provider installed Facebook's Conversions API, which records users' website interactions on the provider's servers and then sends the data to Facebook from those servers. (ECF No. 53 at 3-4.)

The complaint alleged that the provider used these tools for marketing and to bolster its profits, that users did not know of the transmissions, and that the provider had publicly described the lengths it would go to protect patients' health information. It asserted eight claims, and the plaintiffs defended only three of them against the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 53 at 1, 4-5.)

The court accepted the complaint's well-pleaded allegations as true and offered no opinion on the ultimate merits. (ECF No. 53 at 1.)

What the court held

  1. The court explained that a party may lawfully intercept its own communications under the one-party consent rule in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) unless it intercepts them for the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act, and that the crime or tort must be something other than the interception itself. (ECF No. 53 at 6-7)

    The crime or tort can’t be the interception itself.

    ECF No. 53 at 6
  2. A disclosure of individually identifiable health information that violates HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3), is a violation of law independent of the Wiretap Act, which is enough for the crime-tort exception. The court collected decisions from the Northern District of Illinois and elsewhere that agree. (ECF No. 53 at 8-9)

    A disclosure that violates HIPAA is a violation of law that is independent of a violation of the ECPA.

    ECF No. 53 at 8
  3. The court rejected the provider's argument that the exception does not apply because the complaint alleged it acted to make money. It acknowledged decisions holding that a financial motive defeats the exception but found that approach hard to square with the statutory text, which requires a purpose to commit an act that is criminal or tortious, not a criminal or tortious purpose. (ECF No. 53 at 9-11)

    The language of the statute gives no hint that conduct falls outside the reach of the statute if a person acted based on financial motivations.

    ECF No. 53 at 10
  4. A financial motive and a criminal or tortious motive are not mutually exclusive, and a financial motive is not a defense in itself. (ECF No. 53 at 11-12)

    As this Court sees things, the existence of a financial motivation is not a get-out-of-liability-free card.

    ECF No. 53 at 12
  5. Because the complaint alleged that the provider disclosed the plaintiffs' health information to a third party in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3), the crime-tort exception applied at the pleading stage and the motion to dismiss the Wiretap Act claim was denied. (ECF No. 53 at 12)

    That’s enough to get around the ECPA’s one-party consent rule, because the crime-tort exception applies.

    ECF No. 53 at 12
  6. The Illinois Eavesdropping Statute claim was dismissed. Section 14-2(a)(2) reaches only oral communications, and section 14-2(a)(5) reaches information obtained in violation of the statute, which the complaint did not allege: it did not allege that the provider used an eavesdropping device, and the provider, as a party to the communications, did not violate section 14-2(a)(3). (ECF No. 53 at 12-15)

    But here, EEH was a party to the communications.

    ECF No. 53 at 15
  7. The negligence claim survived. The court put aside whether the provider assumed a duty through its privacy representations and held that Illinois law imposes a duty on data collectors to maintain reasonable security measures, that the duty is not limited to data breaches, and that collecting private health data is enough to give rise to a duty of care. (ECF No. 53 at 15-17)

    A health provider that has private medical information in its hands must handle with care.

    ECF No. 53 at 17
  8. The plaintiffs did not defend five other claims, so the court dismissed as abandoned the claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the claims for breach of confidence, invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion and breach of implied contract. (ECF No. 53 at 4-5)

  9. On reconsideration, the court adhered to its reading, acknowledged that courts are split, and certified for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the question whether the exception applies when a complaint alleges a lawful purpose and does not allege a criminal or tortious purpose. It stressed that it had not held that an interception, without more, triggers the exception. (ECF No. 71 at 1, 4 n.1, 5-7)

    The statute requires a purpose to do an unlawful act, not an unlawful purpose to commit an act.

    ECF No. 71 at 5

What it did not decide

  • Whether the data the Pixel and the Conversions API sent was in fact individually identifiable health information, or whether the provider acted knowingly; the court accepted the complaint's allegations and offered no opinion on the ultimate merits (ECF No. 53 at 1, 8).
  • Whether the provider assumed a duty of care through its privacy representations; the court put that question aside (ECF No. 53 at 16).
  • The certified question, which the Seventh Circuit has not decided; the appeal, No. 26-1742, is pending (ECF No. 71 at 7; ECF Nos. 74, 76).
  • Contents, Article III standing, class certification and statutory damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2520; the opinions do not discuss them.

The tracking involved

Tools

  • Meta Pixel
  • Facebook Conversions API (sent from the provider's servers)

Data

  • clicks, keystrokes and details about medical treatment on the website and the MyChart portal, as alleged
  • Facebook ID
  • website interactions stored on the provider's servers and then sent to Facebook

How it bears on website tracking claims

Supports: strengthens a website tracking claim on this issue. Limits: narrows or defeats a website tracking claim on this issue. Context: bears on the issue without deciding it either way.

  • Supports: Crime-tort exception

    Whether a communication was intercepted for the purpose of a criminal or tortious act, which removes the party exception.

    At the pleading stage, the court read 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) to require a purpose to commit an act that is criminal or tortious, not a criminal or tortious purpose, so an alleged marketing or profit motive did not defeat the exception when the alleged act was a disclosure that HIPAA makes a crime. The court still required an act separate from the interception and later stressed that it had not held that interception without more triggers the exception (ECF No. 71 at 4 n.1). It acknowledged a split among district courts, listing decisions such as Sweat v. Houston Methodist Hospital on the other side, and certified the question to the Seventh Circuit, where the appeal is pending.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Supports: HIPAA

    How HIPAA, its criminal provision at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 and HHS guidance bear on tracking.

    The court treated a disclosure of individually identifiable health information to a third party, alleged to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3), as the independent crime the exception requires, and collected decisions in the Northern District of Illinois and elsewhere that agree. It relied on the complaint's allegations about what the Pixel and the Conversions API sent and did not apply HIPAA's definition to particular data.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Context: Party exception

    Whether the website, as a party to the visit, could consent to the tracking under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).

    The court accepted that the provider, as a party, could lawfully intercept its own communications under the one-party consent rule, and decided the federal claim on the crime-tort carve-out. On reconsideration it explained that intercept under the statute means little more than acquire, so a party acquires and in that sense intercepts its own communications, which is why the exception and its carve-out matter (ECF No. 71 at 3-4).

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Limits: State wiretap laws

    State interception statutes, such as California Penal Code § 631 and the Washington Privacy Act.

    The Illinois Eavesdropping Statute claim failed: the court read section 14-2(a)(2) to reach only oral conversations, and held that section 14-2(a)(5) requires information obtained in violation of the statute, which the complaint did not allege, since it alleged no eavesdropping device and the provider was a party to the communications. On that reading, the provisions pleaded did not reach a website operator that was itself a party to the electronic communications.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Supports: State privacy laws

    Other state privacy statutes and claims, such as medical information and health records acts and the CCPA.

    The common-law negligence claim survived on a duty Illinois law imposes on data collectors to maintain reasonable security measures, which the court supported by citing 815 ILCS 530/45(a) and held is not limited to data breaches. The court put aside whether the provider assumed a duty through its privacy representations, which the provider said its privacy policy disclaimed, holding the general duty enough at this stage.

    All tracker entries on this issue

Arguments it addresses

The purpose was marketing or profit, not a crime
The court held that a financial motive does not take conduct outside the exception, because the statute requires a purpose to commit an act that is criminal or tortious, not a criminal or tortious purpose (ECF No. 53 at 9-12; ECF No. 71 at 4-5).
Nobody intended to commit a crime
The court said a party does not have to intend to commit a crime as such; it is enough that the purpose is to do an act that is a crime or tort (ECF No. 53 at 10-11).
The website was a party to the communication
For the federal claim, the court accepted the one-party consent rule but held that the crime-tort exception applied to an alleged HIPAA disclosure; for the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute claim, the provider's status as a party was one reason the claim failed (ECF No. 53 at 6-8, 15).
The disclosure is the same act as the interception
The court held that a disclosure violating HIPAA is independent of the Wiretap Act violation, while agreeing that the interception itself cannot be the crime or tort (ECF No. 53 at 6-8; ECF No. 71 at 4 n.1).
The privacy policy disclaims a duty to protect the information
The court put that question aside and held that Illinois law imposes a duty of care on collectors of private health data in any event (ECF No. 53 at 16-17).

For a company that received a letter

  • This was a ruling on the pleadings: the court accepted the complaint's allegations about the Pixel and the Conversions API as true and offered no view on the ultimate merits.
  • The ruling is on interlocutory appeal in the Seventh Circuit, and the district court itself noted that other courts read the exception to require a criminal or tortious purpose.
  • The Illinois Eavesdropping Statute claim was dismissed because the court read one provision pleaded to reach only oral conversations and the other to require information obtained in violation of the statute, which the complaint did not allege.

What to check on your own site

  • Check whether the Meta Pixel or a server-side conversions connection runs on your website or inside your patient portal, and what each sends.
  • Check whether events sent to an advertising platform travel with identifiers that can tie them to a person's account on that platform.
  • Check whether any server-side tool stores visitor interactions on your servers and forwards them to an advertising platform later.

Later history

On March 3, 2026, the court denied the provider's motion for reconsideration and certified for interlocutory appeal, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the question whether the crime-tort exception applies when a complaint alleges that the defendant acted with a lawful purpose and does not allege a criminal or tortious purpose (ECF No. 71). The Seventh Circuit granted permission to appeal on April 9, 2026 (ECF No. 74), and the appeal, No. 26-1742, is pending; the American Hospital Association and the Illinois Health and Hospital Association filed an amicus brief supporting reversal on May 27, 2026. On April 20, 2026, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a scheduling order without prejudice in light of the pending appeal (ECF No. 77). As of November 10, 2026, the Seventh Circuit's opinions page lists no decision in No. 26-1742.

September 22, 2025 · Court rulingSweat v. Houston Methodist Hospital (S.D. Tex. 2025)For defendantsOn summary judgment, a Texas federal court held a hospital's Facebook Pixel use fell outside the crime-tort exception because the evidence showed it did not know it was disclosing identifiable health information.September 21, 2026 · Court rulingDoe v. Lawrence General Hospital (D. Mass. 2026)For defendantsA federal court dismissed a Wiretap Act claim over a hospital's website tracking, holding the allegations supported at most an inference of awareness that it might disclose private information, not a primary or determinative motive.September 4, 2026 · Court rulingHanson v. Sanford Health (D. Minn. 2026)Mixed rulingA Minnesota federal court let a patient's Wiretap Act claim proceed on an alleged HIPAA disclosure, rejecting profit-motive and independence defenses, but dismissed his intrusion and state health records claims with prejudice.September 9, 2024 · Court rulingA.D. v. Aspen Dental Management (N.D. Ill. 2024)Mixed rulingAn Illinois federal court let a Wiretap Act claim over a dental website's tracking proceed, holding a marketing purpose could not be detached from the alleged disclosure of health information, but dismissed several state claims.March 19, 2024 · Court rulingKane v. University of Rochester (W.D.N.Y. 2024)Mixed rulingA Schedule an Appointment click on a physician's profile, sent to Facebook with the user's Facebook ID, was plausibly individually identifiable health information, so a Wiretap Act claim proceeded under the crime-tort exception.November 14, 2024 · Court rulingCastillo v. Costco Wholesale (W.D. Wash. 2024)Mixed rulingRuling on the pleadings, a Seattle federal court held pharmacy customers' prescription searches sent to Meta were contents and a financial motive does not defeat the crime-tort exception, but dismissed the Washington Privacy Act claim.

Published by Privacy Resolve from public records. It does not cover our own matters.

General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.