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· Court ruling

Doe v. Lawrence General Hospital

U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, No. 1:25-cv-10081-NMG, ECF No. 92

For defendantsReport and recommendation adopted; Wiretap Act count dismissed and state-law claims remanded

Primary source: Memorandum and order. Checked on November 10, 2026.

A federal court dismissed a Wiretap Act claim over a hospital's website tracking, holding the allegations supported at most an inference of awareness that it might disclose private information, not a primary or determinative motive.

What happened

A plaintiff suing as Jane Doe brought a putative class action alleging that Lawrence General Hospital's use of web-tracking tools on its public website violated users' rights and disclosed private health information without authorization. She alleged that the hospital used the tools to support its digital marketing, using information about users' interactions with the site to send targeted ads for its own services, and that it sent the information to third-party platforms such as Google and Meta (ECF No. 92 at 1).

The second amended complaint alleged that the hospital sent user communications to Google and Meta despite assuring users that it would not share patients' medical information without signed authorization, and despite warnings from Google and Meta against using web-tracking tools on healthcare pages (ECF No. 92 at 6-7). It said that whether the hospital used tracking on non-public pages such as patient portals could not be determined before discovery, and relied instead on other hospitals' practices (ECF No. 92 at 5).

On the first motion to dismiss, the court accepted Magistrate Judge Paul G. Levenson's report in part but allowed the plaintiff to amend rather than dismissing the case. After the second amended complaint, the magistrate judge again recommended dismissing the federal Wiretap Act claim, and this order overruled the plaintiff's objections and adopted that recommendation (ECF No. 92 at 1-2, 12).

What the court held

  1. The crime-tort exception requires that the aim of the interception itself be to use the information to commit a crime or tort; it is not enough that a crime or tort was a side effect. Under the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Cassiere, the plaintiff must show that the primary motivation, or a determinative factor, was to commit a criminal, tortious or other injurious act. (ECF No. 92 at 2-4)

  2. The court rejected Stein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health, which it read as requiring only an intentional interception, as conflicting with the statute's heightened mental state requirement and with Cassiere. (ECF No. 92 at 4-5)

    The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Levenson that the Illinois interpretation conflicts with the heightened mens rea requirement found in the ECPA.

    ECF No. 92 at 4
  3. The magistrate judge reasonably declined to infer tracking inside patient portals, because the plaintiff acknowledged she lacked information about the hospital's practices and relied on other hospitals' practices. (ECF No. 92 at 5)

  4. The complaint did not allege that Google or Meta used the information at issue; the only allegation about marketing use concerned the hospital itself. (ECF No. 92 at 6)

    Although the SAC includes the contention that Google and Meta generally monetize user data, it does not allege that either company used the user information at issue here.

    ECF No. 92 at 6
  5. On the theory that the hospital intercepted communications to violate the Massachusetts privacy statute, M.G.L. c. 214, § 1B, the court acknowledged that another judge of the district had denied dismissal on similar allegations in two cases and that a third ruling treated primary motivation as a fact question, and it said those competing approaches left unsettled whether the plaintiff had pleaded facts supporting an inference of tortious purpose. It held that the allegations here supported at most an inference that the hospital was aware it might disclose private information. (ECF No. 92 at 6-8 & n.2)

    the allegations support at most an inference that LGH was aware it might disclose private information, not that it was primarily or determinatively motivated to do so

    ECF No. 92 at 8
  6. HIPAA's criminal provision applies only to individually identifiable health information maintained by a covered entity, which the court read together with the regulatory definition of a designated record set. Because the plaintiff did not claim that the hospital kept public-page interactions or searches in record sets, the allegations did not support a HIPAA violation, and the court adopted the magistrate judge's distinction between public and non-public webpages. (ECF No. 92 at 8-10)

    Even though the distinction between public and non-public webpages articulated by Magistrate Judge Levenson may be unique, it is well-reasoned and will be adopted by this Court.

    ECF No. 92 at 10
  7. Having found no criminal HIPAA violation, the court did not reach the magistrate judge's alternative conclusion that the plaintiff failed to plead a knowing disclosure. (ECF No. 92 at 10-11)

  8. HIPAA's definition of marketing excludes a covered entity's communications describing its own services, and without allegations that Google or Meta used this information for marketing, the complaint did not support an inference that the hospital violated HIPAA. (ECF No. 92 at 11-12)

    Thus, the definition of marketing found in HIPAA excludes the kinds of communications that plaintiff identifies in the SAC, i.e., communications made by LGH to market its own services.

    ECF No. 92 at 11
  9. Count I, the Wiretap Act claim, was dismissed, and Counts II through VII were remanded to the Massachusetts Superior Court for Suffolk County. (ECF No. 92 at 12)

What it did not decide

  • The state-law claims in Counts II through VII, which were remanded to the Massachusetts Superior Court for Suffolk County (ECF No. 92 at 12).
  • Whether the plaintiff adequately pleaded that the hospital knowingly disclosed HIPAA-protected information, an alternative ground the court did not reach (ECF No. 92 at 10-11).
  • How the analysis would apply to tracking inside patient portals or other non-public pages, which the complaint did not allege (ECF No. 92 at 5, 10).
  • Other elements of a Wiretap Act claim, such as interception and contents, which the order does not discuss.

The tracking involved

Tools

  • web-tracking tools sending data to Google and Meta

Data

  • users' interactions with public webpages
  • searches on public webpages

How it bears on website tracking claims

Supports: strengthens a website tracking claim on this issue. Limits: narrows or defeats a website tracking claim on this issue. Context: bears on the issue without deciding it either way.

  • Limits: Crime-tort exception

    Whether a communication was intercepted for the purpose of a criminal or tortious act, which removes the party exception.

    The court required facts showing that committing a crime or tort was the primary motivation or a determinative factor for the interception, and held that a hospital's awareness that it might disclose private information is not enough. It chose that reading over Stein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health while acknowledging that other judges in the same district had treated primary motivation as a fact question. Allegations that the hospital shared data despite assuring users it would not share patients' medical information without signed authorization, and despite warnings from Google and Meta, did not change the result here.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Context: Party exception

    Whether the website, as a party to the visit, could consent to the tracking under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).

    The order starts from the premise that the Wiretap Act is a one-party consent statute, so an interception with one party's consent is not a violation unless the crime-tort exception applies. The order does not discuss any dispute over whether the hospital was a party, so the case turned on purpose.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Limits: HIPAA

    How HIPAA, its criminal provision at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 and HHS guidance bear on tracking.

    The court read HIPAA's criminal provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, to reach only information a covered entity maintains in record sets, and adopted a distinction between public and non-public webpages that it called possibly unique but well reasoned. The order notes that the magistrate judge acknowledged that, given HIPAA's broad definition of individually identifiable health information, the information the hospital allegedly collected could reasonably fall within the provision. It also treated a hospital's ads for its own services as outside HIPAA's definition of marketing, and it pointed to the missing allegation that Google or Meta used the information. That narrows the HIPAA predicate for public-page tracking in this ruling, while leaving tracking inside portals and the platforms' own use of the data unaddressed.

    All tracker entries on this issue

  • Context: State privacy laws

    Other state privacy statutes and claims, such as medical information and health records acts and the CCPA.

    The state-law predicate was the Massachusetts privacy statute, M.G.L. c. 214, § 1B, which the court described as prohibiting interference with privacy that is unreasonable, substantial or serious. The court did not decide whether any disclosure violated it; it held only that the complaint did not plausibly allege an interception for the purpose of violating it, and it remanded the state claims.

    All tracker entries on this issue

Arguments it addresses

The tools were used for marketing, not to commit a tort
The court held the allegations supported at most an inference that the hospital was aware it might disclose private information, not that it was primarily or determinatively motivated to do so (ECF No. 92 at 6-8).
Public website activity is outside HIPAA's criminal provision
The court held that the criminal provision reaches only information a covered entity maintains in record sets, and public-page interactions were not alleged to be kept that way (ECF No. 92 at 8-10).
Ads for the hospital's own services are not HIPAA marketing
The court agreed, in the absence of allegations that Google or Meta used the information at issue for their own marketing (ECF No. 92 at 11-12).
General claims that platforms monetize data are not enough
The court held that allegations that Google and Meta generally monetize user data do not allege that they used the information at issue (ECF No. 92 at 6, 11-12).
Purpose can be decided on a motion to dismiss
The court decided it on the pleadings, while acknowledging that other judges in the district had treated it as a fact question not fit for the pleading stage (ECF No. 92 at 7-8 & n.2).
Stein reads the exception too broadly
The court agreed that Stein's reading conflicts with the statute's heightened mental state requirement and with First Circuit precedent (ECF No. 92 at 4-5).

For a company that received a letter

  • The ruling is a dismissal on the pleadings by one district judge, and the order itself recounts that another judge in the same district denied dismissal on similar allegations in two cases.
  • The court identified what it found missing: tracking inside patient portals, use of the information by Google or Meta, and facts showing purpose rather than awareness.
  • The state-law claims in Counts II through VII went back to state court without a ruling on their merits.

What to check on your own site

  • Check whether tags that send data to Google or Meta run on pages behind your patient portal login.
  • Check whether your privacy notice's statements about sharing medical information match what your site's tags send.
  • Check whether the tags on your health pages follow the restrictions in your advertising vendors' own terms on health information.

Later history

Appeal filed on October 21, 2026 (ECF No. 95) and pending.

September 30, 2026 · Court rulingNova v. Boston Medical Center (D. Mass. 2026)For defendantsA federal court dismissed a hospital website Wiretap Act claim, holding the allegations supported only an inference of commercial purpose and not that the data was kept in a HIPAA record set.March 6, 2026 · Court rulingProgin v. UMass Memorial Health Care (D. Mass. 2026)For defendantsDismissing a Wiretap Act claim against a hospital system, a federal court held allegations of tracker installation and disclosures to Facebook and Google did not show a purpose to commit the specified crimes and torts.March 19, 2026 · Court rulingDoe v. Baystate Health System (D. Mass. 2026)For plaintiffsA Massachusetts federal court refused to dismiss a patient's Wiretap Act claim over a hospital's Meta Pixel and Google Analytics, holding she plausibly alleged an interception for the purpose of violating the state privacy statute.August 14, 2026 · Court rulingVita v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (D. Mass. 2026)For plaintiffsA Massachusetts federal court let a hospital website user who was not a patient pursue her Wiretap Act claim, with the state privacy statute as the separate wrong, dismissing only her breach of confidence claim.July 1, 2026 · Court rulingDoe v. Children's Hospital Corporation (D. Mass. 2026)For plaintiffsAdopting Baystate's reasoning, a federal court in Massachusetts denied a children's hospital's motion to dismiss Wiretap Act and state-law claims over Google and Facebook tracking on its website and patient portal.February 21, 2025 · Court rulingStein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health (N.D. Ill. 2025)Mixed rulingAn Illinois federal court held that a health care provider's alleged disclosure of patient information to Facebook in violation of HIPAA satisfies the crime-tort exception, even if done for profit; the question is on appeal.

Published by Privacy Resolve from public records. It does not cover our own matters.

General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.