· Court ruling
Progin v. UMass Memorial Health Care, Inc.
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, No. 4:25-cv-40003-ADB, ECF No. 43
Primary source: Memorandum and order. Checked on November 10, 2026.
Dismissing a Wiretap Act claim against a hospital system, a federal court held allegations of tracker installation and disclosures to Facebook and Google did not show a purpose to commit the specified crimes and torts.
What happened
Three patients sued UMass Memorial Health Care, Inc. and affiliated hospital entities on behalf of similarly situated Massachusetts citizens, alleging that tracking code on the defendants' public websites and password-protected patient portal sent patients' individually identifiable health information to third parties, including Facebook, Google, Twitter, New Relic, Acquia and ShareThis.com, without their knowledge or consent. The plaintiffs alleged they regularly used the websites and portal; one alleged he researched providers and treatment for a spinal injury on a website and used the portal to schedule appointments, pay bills and review visit summaries. The court took the amended complaint's allegations as true.
The complaint focused on the Meta Pixel, which it alleged logged each page a user visited (including how far the user scrolled), each button clicked (including doctor searches and portal log-ins) and text typed into search boxes about specific conditions and treatments, and on Google Analytics, which it alleged disclosed patients' status and their views of portal pages containing test results and prescription information. It also alleged that the tools collected cookie identifiers, IP addresses, geolocation and browser fingerprints.
The plaintiffs alleged that Google tells developers its marketing products are not appropriate for health-related webpages, that Facebook tells developers the Pixel lets it match website visitors to their Facebook accounts, and that the defendants knowingly sent patient information to Facebook to benefit from its advertising features. For the crime-tort exception they relied on, among other acts, HIPAA's criminal provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, the Massachusetts privacy statute (M.G.L. c. 214, § 1B), the state medical-records confidentiality law (M.G.L. c. 111, § 70E) and the common-law duty of confidentiality. The case began in state court in December 2022, the federal claim was added in December 2024, and the defendants then removed it to federal court for the second time.
What the court held
The court identified the crime-tort exception as the key issue, since the party and consent defenses in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) do not apply when a communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act. (ECF No. 43 at 7-8)
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs had to allege a specific intent to commit a crime or tort as such, or to harm website users. (ECF No. 43 at 8-9)
[t]he purpose must be to commit an act, and that act must be criminal or tortious.
ECF No. 43 at 8 (quoting Stein v. Edward-Elmhurst Health, No. 23-cv-14515 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2025)) The court said a financial motivation and a criminal or tortious motivation are not mutually exclusive. (ECF No. 43 at 9 n.1)
Defendants' business-related motives, which are emphasized in the Amended Complaint, do not negate the purpose requirement.
ECF No. 43 at 9 n.1 The plaintiffs had to plausibly allege that the defendants purposefully used patients' unique health identifiers without authorization, purposefully disclosed individually identifiable health information to Facebook and Google without authorization, or purposefully invaded patients' privacy; alleging knowing conduct does not meet the statute's purpose requirement, which is distinct from the knowing standard in HIPAA's criminal provision. (ECF No. 43 at 9)
It is not enough to allege that Defendants knowingly committed such acts, because that omits the requirement that the acts be done for criminal and tortious purposes as required by the language of the statute.
ECF No. 43 at 9 The allegations might support an inference that the defendants purposefully installed the tracking tools or even disclosed certain information to Facebook and Google, but not that they purposefully committed the specified crimes and torts, and a crime or tort that is a side effect of the interception is not enough; the Wiretap Act count was dismissed. (ECF No. 43 at 9-10 & n.3)
they do not support the inference that Defendants purposefully committed the “criminal and tortious acts” specified by Plaintiffs.
ECF No. 43 at 10 The court did not reach the defendants' argument that the criminal or tortious purpose must be independent of the interception, but it commented on it. (ECF No. 43 at 10 n.4)
the act of disclosure might be construed as independent from the act of interception, even if the acts occur simultaneously
ECF No. 43 at 10 n.4 Having dismissed the only federal claim, the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and granted the motion without prejudice, with leave to amend within 21 days. (ECF No. 43 at 10-11)
What it did not decide
- Whether the criminal or tortious purpose must be independent of the interception; the court did not reach the argument.
- Whether the data the tools sent were contents of communications or individually identifiable health information; the ruling addressed purpose only.
- The state-law claims for invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty and confidentiality, implied contract, unjust enrichment and negligence, over which the court declined supplemental jurisdiction.
The tracking involved
Tools
- Meta Pixel
- Google Analytics
- Tools sending data to Twitter, New Relic, Acquia and ShareThis.com (as alleged)
Data
- Pages visited, scroll depth and content viewed
- Button clicks, including doctor searches and patient portal log-ins
- Search box text about conditions and treatments
- Patient status and views of portal pages with test results and prescription information
- Cookie identifiers, IP addresses, geolocation and browser fingerprints
How it bears on website tracking claims
Supports: strengthens a website tracking claim on this issue. Limits: narrows or defeats a website tracking claim on this issue. Context: bears on the issue without deciding it either way.
Limits: Crime-tort exception
Whether a communication was intercepted for the purpose of a criminal or tortious act, which removes the party exception.
The court dismissed because the complaint did not plead facts showing the defendants acted for the purpose of committing the crimes and torts the plaintiffs specified; knowing conduct was not enough, and a crime or tort that is a side effect of the interception does not count. At the same time, it rejected any requirement of intent to harm or of a desire to commit a crime as such, and it said business motives do not negate the purpose requirement. The dismissal was without prejudice, and other judges in the same district later reached different results, some letting similar claims proceed and others dismissing them, so the ruling reflects one side of a division within the District of Massachusetts.
Context: Party exception
Whether the website, as a party to the visit, could consent to the tracking under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
The court treated the party and consent defenses as available unless the crime-tort exception applies and decided the motion on that exception alone. The ruling therefore turned on how purpose was pleaded, not on who was a party to the communications.
Limits: HIPAA
How HIPAA, its criminal provision at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 and HHS guidance bear on tracking.
The plaintiffs pleaded 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 as one predicate, describing it as making it a crime to use a unique health identifier or to disclose individually identifiable health information without authorization. The court held that the Wiretap Act's purpose element is distinct from HIPAA's knowing standard, so alleging a knowing disclosure did not by itself satisfy the crime-tort exception. It did not decide whether the data at issue were individually identifiable health information.
Context: State privacy laws
Other state privacy statutes and claims, such as medical information and health records acts and the CCPA.
The plaintiffs also offered the Massachusetts privacy statute, the medical-records confidentiality law and the common-law duty of confidentiality as predicates, and the court found the facts did not support an inference that the defendants purposefully invaded patients' privacy. It did not decide the state-law claims themselves, declining supplemental jurisdiction once the federal claim was dismissed.
Arguments it addresses
- The company never intended to harm anyone
- The court rejected an intent-to-harm test: the statute asks whether the purpose was to commit an act that is criminal or tortious, not whether the defendant wanted to cause harm.
- The motive was business, not crime
- The court said business motives do not negate the purpose requirement, but the complaint still had to plead facts showing a purpose to commit the specified crime or tort.
- Knowing about the data flow is not the same as purpose
- The court agreed, holding that allegations of knowing conduct omit the statute's purpose requirement.
- The disclosure is the same act as the interception
- The court did not reach this argument, but noted that disclosure might be construed as independent of interception even when both happen at once.
For a company that received a letter
- The dismissal turned on what this complaint pleaded about purpose, was without prejudice and allowed an amended complaint, which the plaintiffs filed.
- The court rejected an intent-to-harm test and said that a financial motive and a criminal or tortious motive are not mutually exclusive, so the dismissal turned on the facts pleaded about purpose, not on the defendants' business motive.
- Other judges in the same court later reached different results, some letting similar claims proceed and others dismissing them, so the decision is one side of a division within the District of Massachusetts.
What to check on your own site
- List every third-party tool on public pages and the patient portal, including analytics, performance monitoring and sharing widgets, and what each one receives.
- Check whether portal pages that show test results, prescriptions, visit summaries or bills load any third-party analytics or advertising tag.
- Check whether requests to vendors carry cookie identifiers, IP-based location or device details along with page addresses.
Later history
The plaintiffs filed a second consolidated amended complaint on April 10, 2026 (ECF No. 48). The defendants moved to dismiss it on May 8, 2026 (ECF Nos. 51, 52), an opposition followed on June 5, 2026 (ECF No. 53) and a reply on June 26, 2026 (ECF No. 54), and on July 24, 2026 the plaintiffs filed a notice of supplemental authority citing Doe v. The Children's Hospital Corporation (ECF No. 55). The docket on CourtListener, read November 10, 2026, shows no ruling on that motion.
Related rulings
Published by Privacy Resolve from public records. It does not cover our own matters.
General information only, not legal advice, and not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. Laws, deadlines, defenses and outcomes vary by jurisdiction and facts.